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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of new technologies, competition has developed in
many regulated industries once considered natural monopolies.! The
American telecommunications industry has been one of the most prominent
to experience this transformation. Although the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T) virtually controlled domestic telecommunica-
tions for nearly a century,2 the Federal Communications Commission
1. "A natural monopoly is one resulting where one firm of efficient size can produce
all or more than [the] market can take at remunerative price ... [and] is created from
circumstances over which the monopolist has no power." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007
(6th ed. 1990).
2. During the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, the American telecommuni-
cations industry was essentially AT&T's vertically integrated Bell System. See infra notes
38-41 and accompanying text. Although more than fifteen hundred independent telephone
companies operated in the United States during that period, AT&T dominated domestic
telecommunications through its 22 Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) that provided
telephone service to most of the nation's subscribers, its Long Lines Department that
controlled most of the nation's long-distance telephone service market, its Western Electric
subsidiary that manufactured the telephones and wires used by its subscribers as well as the
transmission and switching equipment necessary to operate its telecommunications network,
and its Bell Laboratories that served as its research and development operation and
prescribed the technical standards under which its network functioned. See infra note 36 and
accompanying text; United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 n.3, 136 n.6, 139 n.19,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
(Commission) began to promote competition in the interexchange segment
of that industry after technological innovation made possible the offering of
rival services by others. The Commission's recent efforts to account for
emerging competition in the interexchange market constitute a fundamental
change in its long-standing monopoly-based regulatory approach to
telecommunications.
The most important of these efforts was the Commission's com-
mencement of a formal inquiry and rulemaking to address the propriety of
its proposed Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor (Competitive
Carrier).' In this proceeding, commonly referred to as Competitive Carrier,
the Commission established the first comprehensive framework for
regulating competition in the interexchange market. Through its Competitive
Carrier policies, the Commission sought to address, in the context of
interexchange services, an irony of the regulatory process: regulations
intended to advance the public interest by restraining the exercise of market
power may nevertheless have an anticompetitive effect by, among other
things, creating barriers to market entry and encouraging collusion.
The Commission based Competitive Carrier on the notion that
indiscriminately imposing on all interexchange common carriers the panoply
170-172 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nor. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
In sum, "[tlhe total package was bundled together as an end-to-end service with ownership
of all facilities by [AT&T]." A. MICHAEL NOLL, INTRODUCTION TO TELEPHONES &
TELEPHONE SYSTEMS 208 (2d ed. 1991).
3. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice ofInquiry and Proposed Rulemaking,
77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Notice oflnquy]; First Report and
Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215 (1980) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier
First Report]; Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981) [hereinafter
Competitive Carrier Further Notice]; Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Second Report]; Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (1982) (to be codified at 47
C.F.RL ch. 1) (proposed Apr. 22, 1982) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Second Further
Notice]; Order on Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 54, 53 Rad Reg. 2d (P & F) 735 (1983)
(denying petitions to reconsider the Second Report) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier
Reconsideration Order]; Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63) (proposed Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Third
Report]; Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (1983) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63) (proposed June 21, 1983) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier
Third Further Notice]; Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1219 (1983) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Fourth Report]; Fourth Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 96 F.C.C.2d 922 (1984) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Fourth
Further Notice]; Ffth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204
(1984) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Fifth Report]; Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d
1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391 (1985) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Sixth Report].
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of regulations set forth in Title II of the Communications Act of 1934
(Communications Act)4 would inhibit competition. Instead, the Commission
found that Congress intended for Title II to govern only carriers possessing
market power. For this reason, the Commission undertook a progressively
deregulatory approach to carriers which it determined lacked market power,
initially streamlining its Title II regulation of them and ultimately forbearing
from the tariff and facilities regulation of them, while maintaining full Title
II regulation of carriers which it concluded had such power. The Commis-
sion anticipated that this approach would benefit the public by creating an
interexchange market in which all carriers could compete fairly regardless
of market power.
Despite the broad mandate it received from Congress in the Communi-
cations Act to regulate telecommunications in the public interest, the
Commission's approach to competition in the interexchange market has been
shaped largely by the courts. The courts created the legal environment
necessary for competition to thrive and compelled the Commission to
nurture competitive forces during their infancy.5 Once these forces began
4. Communications Act of 1934, Title II, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-229.
5. AT&T's virtual monopoly first eroded in the market for customer premises telephone
equipment (CPE). See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(invalidating AT&T tariffs that created "unwarranted interference with the telephone sub-
scriber's right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without
being publicly detrimental"); Hush-A-Phone v. AT&T, 22 F.C.C. 112, 114 (1957)
(prohibiting AT&T tariffs that infringed on a customer's use of any "device which does not
injure [AT&T] employees, [AT&T] facilities, [or] the public in its use of [AT&T's] services,
or impair the operation of the telephone system"); In re Use of the Carterfone Device in
Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420,423-426 (1968), recon. denied,
14 F.C.C.2d 571, para. 8, 14 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 185 (1968) (invalidating AT&T tariffs
that permitted network interconnection only via AT&T equipment); In re Proposals for New
or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and
Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593, paras. 17-
59 (1975) (establishing registration program that allowed interconnection of all CPE
complying with certain technical standards). Spurred by the development of a competitive
CPE market, competition began to evolve in the interexchange market. See In Re Allocation
of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., Report and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959)
(allocating spectrum for, and authorizing the use of, private point-to-point microwave
systems that operated outside AT&T's network); In Re Microwave Communications, Inc.,
Decision, 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 16 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1037 (1969) (granting request to offer
small businesses interoffice and interplant communications on a limited common carrier
microwave basis); In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of
Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-
to-Point Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the
Commission's Rules, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 87, 22 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1501
(1971) (approving provision of specialized common carrier services to various parts of
United States via microwave and stating policy in favor of equal exchange access), affd, 31
F.C.C.2d 1106, 23 Rad. Reg. (P & F) (1971), affdsub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975); Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3rd
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to mature, the need for rules to ensure that they served the public interest
became apparent. Competitive Carrier was the Commission's primary
response to this need, but the courts often intervened to find that its most
deregulatory provisions were inconsistent with the Communications Act. As
a result, while forbearance from tariff regulation was the heart of the
Competitive Carrier approach, only streamlined Title II regulation survived
judicial review. Because sufficient statutory support existed for upholding
Competitive Carrier in its entirety, such close judicial scrutiny suggested
that the courts had their own agenda for telecommunications policy. Thus,
the conflict which characterized the relationship between the Commission
and the courts over the regulation of competition in the interexchange
market had decisive policy implications.
Nonetheless, even without judicial interference, the viability of
Competitive Carrier was questionable from the outset. The growth of
competition in the interexchange market, and therefore the demise of that
market as a natural monopoly, was inevitable once the widespread use of
microwave and other technology in communications became practicable. 6
A fundamental tenet of Competitive Carrier, however, was that the
interexchange market would include, for the foreseeable future, some
carriers that possessed market power and others that did not. To adhere to
this principle, the Commission had to ignore the effects of the judicially
supervised breakup of the mammoth Bell System and then regulate AT&T
as a carrier with market power long after that power had ceased. In sum, the
Commission failed to account fully for market power being largely the
result of certain carriers having the ability to deny access to the interex-
change network through their control of essential "bottleneck" facilities and
to recognize that competition would flourish once this ability no longer
existed. Until they more accurately accounted for market realities, the
Commission's policies could not enjoy full legitimacy and effectiveness
under any circumstances.
By the time the Commission's policies finally began to account more
accurately for such realities, Congress was preparing to implement new laws
to govern the telecommunications industry. Through its passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which made the achievement of a
Cir. 1974) (affirming Commission order directing AT&T to permit specialized common
carriers to interconnect with its network on a nondiscriminatory basis to provide certain
services); MCI v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (authorizing the offering of a metered
telephone service that competed with AT&T's long-distance telephone services).
6. For example, the introduction of satellite systems, the advancement of computer
science and methods of data transmission, and the expansion of resale and shared use of
common carrier services and facilities.
[Vol. 49
Number 2] REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE IXC MARKET 373
deregulated, competitive telecommunications miidustry a national priority7
Congress assisted both the Commission and the judiciary by providing
needed legislative direction for the development of a coherent regulatory
approach to interexchange competition. Most notably, the Telecommunica-
tions Act reinvigorated Competitive Carrier by resolving the long-debated
forbearance issue in the Commission's favor. Thus, while the Commission
was dilatory in acknowledging market realities throughout Competitive
Carrier, the Telecommunications Act has confirmed that the forbearance
policies it developed during that proceeding were necessary and proper to
foster interexchange competition.
The Telecommunications Act's forbearance provisions, which
authorize the Commission to relieve carriers of their duty to comply with
statutory and regulatory requirements, facilitate the growth of interexchange
competition in three significant ways. First, these provisions enhance the
Commission's ability to promote service innovation, competitive pricing,
and market entry through both the abolishment of regulatory disclosures that
may have anticompetitive effects, such as tariff filings and applications for
facilities authorizations, and the reduction of carriers' costs resulting from
the easing of regulatory constraints. Second, these provisions afford the
Commission the regulatory flexibility necessary to govern an industry, like
telecommunications, that is continuously evolving. Third, these provisions
enable the Commission to reduce its administrative costs in markets where
competitive forces effectively discipline carriers' behavior and to expend its
resources only where regulatory oversight is essential, such as in noncom-
petitive markets still dominated by one or more firms. Consequently, by
expressly conferring forbearance authority on the Commission, the
Telecommunications Act has given the Commission the tools required to
fulfill its statutory mandate and create a competitive interexchange market
that is responsive to the public's needs.
To accomplish this goal, however, the Commission must understand
existing market conditions and tailor its policies to them. Consistent with
its Competitive Carrier approach, market power should serve as the
determinative factor in the Commission's inquiry into whether forbearance
treatment is appropriate for some or all of the activities of a carrier or class
of carriers because firms that lack such power necessarily are competitive
while those that possess such power are not. In conducting this inquiry, the
Commission cannot be reluctant to extend forbearance to carriers that lack
7. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be
codified in scattered sections at 47 U.S.C.); H.RL CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
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market power because any such delay may impede competition as well as
cause the affected carriers to suffer dire financial consequences as they,
unlike their forborne competitors, must continue to endure the burdens of
Title II regulation. By contrast, when evidence on the issue of market power
is inconclusive and the existence of competitive forces to control the subject
carrier's behavior therefore is uncertain, the Commission must exercise
caution in extending forbearance because Title II regulation provides a
useful mechanism to monitor market behavior and prevent abuses in the
absence of competition. Hence, the effectiveness of the Telecommunications
Act's forbearance provisions in advancing interexchange competition
depends on the Commission's ability to evaluate accurately and objectively
the extent to which carriers have the means to exert market power and to
act swiftly and without hesitation when deregulation is in the public interest.
This article analyzes the Commission's recent market power approach
to the regulation of competition in the interexchange market, with an
emphasis on the arduous administrative, judicial, and legislative course
taken to develop and implement forbearance as the primary regulatory
policy. Part I introduces the regulatory scheme on which the Commission
based Competitive Carrier. Part III surveys the Commission's initial
Competitive Carrier policies, including the development of "streamlined"
regulation for carriers that lacked market power. Part IV recounts the
evolution of Competitive Carrier from streamlined regulation to forbearance
from the tariff and facilities regulation of carriers that lacked market power.
Part V analyzes the impact of forbearance on telecommunications carriers,
the Commission, and the public. Part VI evaluates the judicial rejection of
forbearance. Part VII examines the Commission's regulatory policies
following the judicial rejection of forbearance. Part VIII considers the
impact of the Telecommunications Act on the Commission's regulatory
approach to competition in the interexchange market. Part IX concludes by
recommending that the Commission promote interexchange competition by
adopting a forbearance policy which accurately accounts for prevailing
market conditions and governing law.
II. DEVISING A REGULATORY APPROACH To INTEREXCHANGE
COMPETIrION
A. The Commission's Authority To Regulate Competition
In the Communications Act, Congress gave the Commission a broad
statutory mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry in the public
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interest.8 It created the Commission for the express "purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States
a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication
service."9 To facilitate this purpose and thereby further the public interest,
Congress empowered the Commission to promulgate all "necessary" rules
and regulations."° Included within this responsibility was the duty to
enforce Title II, which imposed traditional "natural monopoly" rate and
service regulation on interstate telecommunications common carriers."
By the late 1970s, the Commission recognized that competition was
developing in the domestic interexchange market and determined that
regulations to advance it were "necessary."' 12 As a result, in September
1979, the Commission commenced Competitive Carrier pursuant to its Title
II responsibility to regulate the rates and services of telecommunications
common carriers.' 3 According to the Commission, Competitive Carrier,
which adopted a new approach to rate, tariff, and facilities regulation in
order to enhance competition, service diversity, and consumer welfare while
reducing regulatory burdens, was a proper exercise of its "broad discretion
in choosing how to regulate" under Title II.
14
B. The DominantNondominant Carrier Approach
In Competitive Carrier, the Commission adopted a bifurcated approach
to regulate competition. Under this approach, the Commission oddly did not
first define the relevant markets for telecommunications services or consider
whether these markets were competitive and then regulate them according-
ly.'" Rather, it examined certain characteristics of the participants in these
8. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 168 (1967) (recognizing that the Commission received "broad authority" to "serve as
the 'single Government agency' with 'unified jurisdiction' and 'regulatory power over all
forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio"').
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
10. See id. §§ 154(i), 201(b).
11. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing Title II regulation); supra
note 1 (defining "natural monopoly").
12. Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 6; see also United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 161-62 (D.D.C. 1982) (observing that, "at least by the
mid-1970s, the FCC had clearly begun to promote competition in telecommunications").
13. See Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 6 (1979); see also
Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (pointing out that "an agency normally
possesses a generous measure of discretion respecting the launching of rulemaking
proceedings").
14. AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 1978).
15. The Commission later concluded that it had to define the relevant markets for
telecommunications services in order for its Competitive Carrier classification scheme to
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
markets and established two distinct sets of rules to regulate the firms
which, based on its assessment of these characteristics, had or lacked the
ability and incentive to impede competition. The Commission referred to
this categorization of firms as a "dominant/nondominant carrier classifica-
tion scheme."'
16
Market power, which enables a firm to control the price of goods and
services without effective challenge, was the determinative factor under this
classification scheme. 7 The Commission explained its significance:
A firm with market power is able to engage in conduct that may be
anticompetitive or otherwise inconsistent with the public interest. This
may entail setting price above competitive costs in order to earn
supranormal profits, or setting price below competitive costs to forestall
entry by new competitors or to eliminate existing competitors."
Such power gives a firm the ability and incentive to subsidize its competi-
tive services with revenue generated from its monopoly or near-monopoly
services.' 9 Perhaps the most striking evidence of market power is a firm's
control over "bottleneck facilities." '2 According to the Commission,
"control of bottleneck facilities [is] prima facie evidence of market power
requiring detailed regulatory scrutiny" because nondiscriminatory access to
such facilities is essential for competition to thrive.21 Due to the potential
detrimental impact of market power on competition, the Commission held
that any carrier possessing such power was a "dominant carrier."2'
All other carriers, by contrast, were "nondominant carriers.' 2' These
firms lacked the ability and incentive to price their goods and services
unjustly or unreasonably because, if they overpriced, they would lose
remain viable. See infra notes 155-174 and accompanying text.
16. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 54, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 215 (1980). Except for AT&T and the United States Independent Telephone Association,
which raised legal, economic, and policy objections, most parties "enthusiastically en-
dorse[d]" this two-tiered classification scheme. Id. para. 22. Some parties, such as Western
Union, opposed the Commission's classification of them. Id. para. 23; see also infra notes
49-55 and accompanying text.
17. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 54, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
18. Id. para. 56.
19. Id. para. 15.
20. Id. The Commission stated that "[c]ontrol of bottleneck facilities is present when a
firm or group of firms has sufficient command over some essential commodity or facility
in its industry or trade to be able to impede new entrants." Id. para. 59 (footnote omitted).
The existence of only a few minor competitors, barriers inhibiting market entry, and few
reasonably substitutable goods and services are evidence that a firm controls bottleneck
facilities. Id. para. 57.
21. Id. paras. 58-59.
22. Id. paras. 54-55.
23. Id.
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market share to their competitors who set price equal to marginal cost and,
if they underpriced, they would never have the opportunity to recoup their
losses.24 These firms likewise could not unjustly or unreasonably discrimi-
nate against certain customers, terminate or reduce service, or overbuild
facilities without placing themselves at a competitive disadvantage.25
Finally, these firms could not exert anticompetitive control over any service
markets because they controlled no bottleneck facilities.26
Although some carriers had market power as to certain services and
were competitive as to others, the Commission declined to create a third
classification that recognized such hybrids. Instead, it treated all carriers
as "single output firms."28 When a carrier had market power in at least one
service market, it was a dominant carrier for all regulatory purposes.29 The
Commission described this scheme as "a conservative approach to
regulation."'3 In addition to being conservative, however, this approach
greatly simplified the Commission's regulatory burden.
The Commission made clear in the First Report that, of the two
classifications of firms it recognized, only nondominant carriers would
benefit from Competitive Carrier. It determined that applying existing
"regulatory procedures to non-dominant carriers impose[d] unnecessary and
counterproductive regulatory constraints" because such competitive carriers
"could not rationally engage in the activities proscribed by the operative
provisions of Title 11 of the Communications Act, viz. Sections 201-205 and
214. ' By contrast, the Commission regulated dominant carriers as if they
were the foes of competition. It determined that substantial regulation of
dominant carriers remained necessary to "insure that they did not exploit
their market power to the detriment of the public. 32 With this predisposi-
tion, the Commission undertook the classification of the disparate carriers
composing the telecommunications industry.
C. Classifying The Carriers
To implement its dominant/nondominant classification scheme, the
24. Id. para. 55.
25. Id. para. 56.
26. Id. paras. 58-59.
27. Id. at 22 n.55, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 230 n.55.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Commission modified this position as its Competitive Carrier policies
evolved. See infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
30. The Commission stated that it would address "the much more complex issue of the
regulation of multi-output carriers" in subsequent rulemakings. See id.
31. Id. para. 54.
32. Id. para. 15 (footnote omitted).
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Commission divided the telecommunications industry into six categories of
carriers.33 These categories included telephone companies, Western Union,
domestic satellite carriers (Domsats), miscellaneous common carriers
(MCCs), specialized common carriers (SCCs), and resale carriers.34 The
Commission concluded that the first four were dominant carriers and the
latter two were not.
35
1. The Dominant Carriers
a. Telephone Companies
The telephone company category included AT&T, along with its
operating companies and Long Lines Department, and the approximately
fifteen hundred independent telephone companies located throughout the
United States.36 According to the Commission, all telephone companies
were dominant carriers. 3
The Commission found that AT&T was the quintessential dominant
carrier for five reasons. 38 First, AT&T controlled access to more than 80
percent of the domestic telephone market through its operating companies
and Long Lines Department.39 Second, AT&T's network constituted a
bottleneck facility, at both the local exchange and interexchange levels, to
which other carriers required access in order to compete successfully
because of the financial and logistical impediments to constructing
alternative networks." Third, AT&T had an "overwhelming share" of the
long-distance telephone service market.4 ' Fourth, AT&T was "dominant
in virtually every private line service where other common carriers also
compete[d]".42 Finally, AT&T regularly overpriced its private line services
33. Id. para. 61. The Commission retained this classification scheme with six categories
of carriers throughout Competitive Carrier. As the Commission developed its policies,
however, it reclassified certain categories of carriers from dominant to nondominant. See
infra notes 155-176 and accompanying text.
34. Id. para. 15. The Commission initially excluded radio common carriers, which
competed with telephone companies in the mobile radio telephone service market, and
multipoint distribution service carriers, which provided mostly local distribution of closed
circuit video signals, from Competitive Carrier. See Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry,
77 F.C.C.2d 308, 319 n.15 (1979).
35. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d I, paras. 62-84,52 Rad. Reg. 2d 115.
36. Id. paras. 62-65.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. para. 62.
40. Id.
41. Id. para. 63.
42. Id.
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in violation of the Commission's cost standards.43 Based on these factors,
the Commission concluded that AT&T indisputably had the market power
necessary for classification as a dominant carrier.'
Although the Commission determined that the independent telephone
companies were also dominant carriers, their market power derived from the
franchises they held to provide local telephone service in their assigned
exchange areas coupled with their association with AT&T to provide long-
distance telephone service to their customers.45 The exchange facilities
owned by the independent telephone companies, like AT&T's operating
companies, were "essential facilities" to which competitors needed access
in order to provide comparable alternative service to the same areas.46 In
addition, the independent telephone companies "share[d] in AT&T's market
power" because their agreements with AT&T had "the effect of tying all
telephone companies together in a joint venture providing basic service. '
Consequently, all of these companies required similar regulatory treat-
ment.
48
b. Western Union
The Commission classified Western Union as a dominant carrier on
the grounds that it held a "virtual de facto monopoly" over Telex and TWX
services.!9 In opposition, Western Union argued that these services
comprised an insignificant share of the business communications market,
which it claimed was the relevant market for classification purposes, and
that many substitute services were available."0 Observing that "Telex and
TWX were the only significant domestic switched networks dedicated to
teletypewriter, [which was] written record service on an exchange basis,"'"
the Commission disagreed.52 It noted that facsimile was the only compara-
ble alternative, but pointed out that reliance on that service was unreason-
able because it was in the early stages of development. The Commission
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. para. 65.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Commission noted, however, that certain independent telephone companies
could enter new service or geographic markets in which they were not dominant. See id. at
24 n.61, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 232 n.61.
49. Id. para. 66. For an explanation of Telex and TWX services, see infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
50. Id. para. 68.
5I. Id. para. 66.
52. Id. para. 69
53. Id.
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also concluded that Western Union had defined the relevant market too
broadly and that the anticipated market entry of firms with competitive
services was irrelevant to Western Union's existing market power. 4 Thus,
the Commission held that there was an "[in]sufficient restraining effect on
[Western Union's] pricing and marketing conduct to justify a finding of
non-dominance at this time.,
55
c. Domestic Satellite Carriers
Domsats "transmit signals between earth stations and satellites in
geostationary orbit."56 Some provide service over their own facilities,
including earth stations and satellites, while others do so by combining their
own earth stations with satellite capacity obtained from resellers7
Although the Commission speculated that regulating Domsats could disserve
the public interest,58 it nevertheless classified them as dominant carriers in
order to maintain a consistent regulatory policy.59 The limited number of
operational satellites caused the demand for Domsat service to exceed the
available supply and therefore gave Domsats the ability and incentive to
raise their prices until demand equaled supply." As a result, Domsats had
market power,61 requiring the Commission to classify them as dominant
carriers or create an exception to the principles underlying its classification
scheme. The Commission chose the former option.62
d. Miscellaneous Common Carriers
Like Domsats, the Commission classified MCCs, which relayed video
and audio signals by terrestrial microwave links throughout the United
States and particularly in remote areas, as dominant carriers even though it
54. Id. paras. 70-71.
55. Id. para. 71.
56. Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 23 (1979).
57. Id. para. 22.
58. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 75, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 215. The Commission hypothesized that if it regulated the price for transponder space,
then Domsats' market power would shift to Domsat resellers. Id. It pointed out, however,
that if it similarly regulated the prices of Domsat resellers, then cable systems and program
suppliers, not the public, would enjoy the economic rewards. Id. Thus, "[u]nder such
conditions, the benefits of regulation are questionable." Id.
59. Id. para. 76. The Commission noted that, to regulate Domsats properly, it would
have to reassess its cost-based approach to evaluating whether charges, terms, and conditions
for service were "just and reasonable" as required by section 201(b). Id. para. 75.
60. Id. para. 76.
61. Id.
62. See id.
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questioned the propriety of doing so.63 MCCs generally competed with
Domsats in providing video interconnection service except that Domsats did
not relay the major broadcast networks' signals." Consequently, in areas
where over-the-air reception was poor, MCCs had market power because
they had the ability to overprice their service." The Commission recog-
nized, however, that "terrestrial video interconnection is a technology that
has been, and will continue to be, faced with declining demand."' For this
reason, although MCCs were dominant carriers by definition, the Commis-
sion agreed to reconsider its regulatory approach to them in order to design
regulations that "promote[d] more efficient service to the public." 67
2. The Nondominant Carriers
a. Specialized Common Carriers
SCCs provide terrestrial point-to-point voice communications and
analog and digital data transmissions primarily over their own facilities."
At the time Competitive Carrier commenced, most SCCs also offered
switched services and some provided long-distance services equivalent to
MTS/WATS.69 Even though they offered terrestrial voice and data services
like the telephone companies, however, the Commission classified SCCs as
nondominant carriers." It based this determination on SCCs' small market
share, AT&T's ability to set an "umbrella price" for the market which
63. Id. paras. 77-78. Although MCCs were dominant carriers under Competitive Carrier,
the Commission decided to continue regulating them under the principles set forth in In Re
American Television Relay, Inc. (ATR), Decision and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 911, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 65 F.C.C.2d 792 (1977), modified sub nom. Las Cruces TV Cable v.
FCC, 645 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
64. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d I, par. 77, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 215.
65. Id. The Commission acknowledged that potential competition from Cable Television
Relay Stations (CARS) could limit the ability of MCCs to overprice, but noted that CARS
were not yet operational in areas served by MCCs. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 20 (1979). SCCs
included national firms, such as MCI and Southern Pacific Communications Corporation
(Sprint), and regional firms. Id. In 1979, SCCs still delivered most of their transmissions
over microwave facilities. See id.
69. Id. MTS (Message Telecommunications Service) and WATS (Wide Area
Telecommunications Service) were the switched interstate long distance telephone services
'offered by AT&T. See In re Matter of Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related
Tariffs: AT&T Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 989, para.
1 (1984).
70. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 79, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
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constrained the rates that SCCs could charge, the availability of AT&T's
"readily substitutable service" if SCCs behaved anticompetitively, the
existence of low entry barriers that encouraged new carriers to enter the
market if SCCs overpriced their services, and SCCs' inability to drive
AT&T out of the market through underpricing and then recouping their
resultant losses through overpricing.71 In sum, the Commission held that
SCCs were nondominant carriers because "the likelihood of a predatory
pricing campaign by a SCC ending up with the predator as monopolist is
virtually nonexistent. '
b. Resale Carriers
Resale carriers lease facilities from other carriers in order to provide
services to their own customers. 7 3 In general, they employ these facilities
"to make available through the use of their own switches and computers a
special purpose network that can transmit data and facsimile with special
features that are often attractive for business use."'74 Certain resale carriers
offer, for example, long-distance service in competition with AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint, while others lease satellite capacity from Domsats to resell the
transmission of broadcast signals to cable television systems. 5 Often,
when desired services are not available to the public from underlying
carriers, resale carriers meet that need.76
Because the Commission found that resale carriers were apparently
subject to more actual and potential competition than any other carrier, it
classified them as nondominant." Like SCCs, resale carriers encountered
few entry barriers, lacked the ability to overprice their services without
encouraging the entry of new competition, and confronted a variety of
competitive services from other carriers that were reasonably substitutable
71. Id. paras. 79-81. Comparing the capacity of AT&T with SCCs' as a group, the
Commission found that "[i]n 1979 the SCCs owned approximately 30,000 voice-grade
circuits in the top 100 markets ... [while] AT&T alone owned 2.3 million individual
interexchange circuits and more than 80 million exchange loops." Id. para. 79.
72. Id. para. 81.
73. Id. para. 82. Resale carriers leased most of their circuits from AT&T. Competitive
Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 24.
74. Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 24. The Second
Circuit upheld the Commission's treatment of resale carriers as common carriers under Title
II. See AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 24-27 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 24.
76. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 82, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 215.
77. See id. The Commission determined that only Domsat resellers were dominant
carriers for the same reasons that Domsats themselves were dominant. Id. para. 83; see also
supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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for their own.!' Resale carriers therefore were nondominant because they
had no market power.79
Im. THE REGULATION OF DOMINANT AND NONDOMINANT
CARRIERS
The retention of existing Title H regulation for dominant carriers and
gradual deregulation for nondominant carriers characterized the Commis-
sion's Competitive Carrier approach.80 While the Commission continued
to impose traditional Title H regulation on dominant carriers, it commenced
Competitive Carrier with the adoption of a "streamlined" approach to the
regulation of nondominant carriers.8 ' Thereafter, the Commission further
liberalized its regulatory approach to nondominant carriers, adopting initially
a permissive forbearance policy regarding tariff and facilities regulation and
later a mandatory forbearance policy regarding tariff regulation.2 As this
deregulation evolved, the Commission included new firms within the
category of nondominant carriers.83 By the time it concluded Competitive
Carrier, the Commission classified as nondominant almost all interexchange
carriers.
A. The Dominant Carriers
Because dominant carriers had the ability and incentive to exercise
their market power contrary to the public interest, the Commission
concluded in the First Report that retaining its existing regulatory approach
to them was necessary.85 This approach imposed the gamut of common
carrier regulations set forth in Title II, as supplemented by the Commis-
sion's rules, on dominant carriers.86
78. Id. para. 80-81. The Commission pointed out that resale carriers had the lowest
investment requirements and the fewest construction delays. Competitive Carrier Notice of
Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 24. Resale carriers also had the ability to engage in arbitrage
and defeat dominant carriers' efforts to discriminate when pricing services. Competitive
Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 82, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215.
79. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 82.
80. See infra notes 85-178 and 187-213 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 85-131 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 132-78,and 187-213 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
84. See id.
85. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 54-58, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 215.
86. See id. The Commission referred to such regulation as '"traditional Title II regula-
tion,"' meaning "control over price, publication of terms and conditions of service, control
over investments and the obligation to serve all." Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91
F.C.C.2d 59, 60 n.3, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203,
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Title H placed numerous restrictions on dominant carriers' exercise of
market power.87 First, dominant carriers had to provide services to all
creditworthy customers on reasonable request.88 Second, dominant carriers
could only impose just and reasonable charges, terms, and conditions for
their services and could not engage in unjust or unreasonable discrimina-
tion.8 9 Third, dominant carriers could only offer services on a tariffed basis
and any changes to established services or to charges, terms, or conditions
for service could only take effect after ninety-day advance notice to the
Commission and the public." Fourth, dominant carriers were vulnerable
to having their tariffs suspended for as many as five months by the
Commission, on its own initiative or pursuant to complaints filed by
members of the public, pending an investigation into their legality.9 Fifth,
when dominant carriers committed statutory violations, the Commission had
jurisdiction to prescribe just and reasonable charges, terms, and conditions
for their services, to issue cease and desist orders against them, and to
award damages against them.92 Finally, dominant carriers could not
construct, acquire, or operate any facilities or "discontinue, reduce, or
impair" their services without Commission authorization.93
Through its rules implementing Title If, the Commission sought to
restrain dominant carriers' exercise of market power by burdening them with
a regulatory regime designed to substitute for the competition they
lacked.94 This regulation eliminated dominant carriers' flexibility as the
primary service providers in their markets and subjected them to substantial
costs, delays, and oversight.9 The premise of this approach was that the
public would benefit more as a result of such intrusive regulation than if
dominant carriers operated unimpeded in their own self-interest.
214).
87. The following list is not exclusive, but rather identifies the Title II regulations that
are most onerous for dominant carriers.
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
89. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).
90. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), (b)(1); see also MCI v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 333-334 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (discussing Commission's section 204 authority). A tariff "is not a mere contract,"
but rather "is the law." Carter v. AT&T, 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966); see also AT&T
v. Florida-Texas Freight, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 977, 979 (S.D. Fla.) (stating that "tariffs validly
filed in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 203 operate to conclusively and exclusively control the
rights and liabilities between the parties"), affld, 485 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1973).
91. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)(1), 208(a).
92. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 206, 207, 209.
93. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a).
94. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 61 (1995).
95. See id.
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B. The Nondominant Carriers
In contrast to its continued traditional Title II regulation of dominant
carriers, the Commission adopted a "streamlined" approach to regulate
nondominant carriers in the First Report. 6 Under this approach, the
Commission substantially reduced or eliminated many of the Title 11
regulations still governing dominant carriers It anticipated that, unlike
traditional Title II regulation, this "streamlined regulation" would facilitate
nondominant carriers' response "to the demands of the competitive
marketplace with a minimum of regulatory interference."
9 8
1. Presumption of Lawfulness on Petitions to Suspend
Because section 204 challenges to tariffs burdened the filing carriers
and delayed the availability of new services to the public,9 the Commis-
sion adopted as a fundamental principle of streamlined regulation the
presumption that all nondominant carrier tariffs were lawful."° According-
ly, the Commission announced that it would forego its statutory right to
suspend tariff filings "except for the most compelling reasons 10 1 and
promulgated a four-part test, analogous to the requirements for issuing a
preliminary injunction, which petitioners had to satisfy in order to rebut the
presumption of lawfulness and establish grounds for suspension pending an
investigation." Although the Commission stated that it might give some
96. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 85-147, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215 (1980). Although the Commission initially limited the application of this
streamlined regulation to nondominant carriers serving the continental United States, it
subsequently extended this policy to such carriers serving "Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and other domestic offshore points" in the Third Report released nearly three
years later. See Competitive Carrier Third Report, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791, para. 5 (1983).
97. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 85-147, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
98. Id. para. 85; see also Wold Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (stating that "the public interest touchstone of the Communications Act, beyond
question, permits the FCC to allow the marketplace to substitute for direct Commission
regulation in appropriate circumstances").
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 88-96, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 215. This presumption only applied, however, to petitions to suspend tariffs and not
to challenges made through the Commission's formal complaint and investigation process.
See id. para. 94; Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 59.
101. See Competitive Canier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 59; see also 47
U.S.C. § 204(a)(1) (1994).
102. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, par. 107, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215; Competitive Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 59. Under this test,
the petitioner must show: "(I) that there is a high probability that the tariff would be found
to be unlawful after an investigation (likelihood of success on the merits); (2) that any harm
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deference to customers bringing such petitions because they "do not usually
file petitions merely as a form of competitive harassment as do competing
carriers,"" it warned that "competitors should devote their time and
energies to devising new and innovative services and pricing strategies
rather than complaining about each other's tariffs."1"
Relying on the same principles it used to define the class of nondomi-
nant carriers, the Commission discounted the possibility that this presump-
tion of lawfulness would cause nondominant carriers to shirk their
continuing statutory obligations as common carriers not to impose unjust
and unreasonable charges, terms, or conditions for service"~ or to
discriminate unjustly or unreasonably in providing services.106 The
Commission concluded that nondominant carriers could not rationally
violate these mandates because they operated in a competitive market."°
If nondominant carriers overcharged or demanded unreasonable terms or
conditions, the Commission expected the market to punish them by
encouraging customers to seek services elsewhere. 08 The Commission
also contended that nondominant carriers could not rationally engage in
predatory pricing because they could never recover their losses or force
dominant firms like AT&T out of the market.'0 9 Under these circum-
stances, the Commission predicted that it would rarely have to initiate
proceedings against nondominant carriers to enforce sections 201 or 202." °
alleged to competition (which [the Commission] believe[s] accomplishes public interest
benefits) would be more substantial than that to the public arising from unavailability of the
service pursuant to the rates and conditions proposed in the tariff filing (e.g., that the
proposed rate is predatory); (5) [sic] that irreparable injury would be suffered if suspension
does not issue; and (4) that the suspension would not otherwise be contrary to the public
interest." Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 107, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215 (footnote omitted); Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d para. 59.
103. See Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 60. The Commis-
sion subsequently acknowledged that customers have an interest in maintaining low rates and
therefore may file petitions challenging new tariffs. See Competitive Carrier First Report,
85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 110, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215. It is unclear how much deference
the Commission intended to grant to customers during this process. See id.
104. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 110, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
105. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
106. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(b). Nondominant carriers also continued to have the common
carrier obligation to provide service to all creditworthy customers on reasonable request. See
47 U.S.C. § 201(a).
107. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d I, para. 88, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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2. No Economic Data To Support Tariff Filings
Unlike dominant carrier tariffs, which reflected the exercise of market
power tempered by regulation, nondominant carrier tariffs were primarily
the products of competition."' As a result, although the Commission
concluded that the filing of "extensive cost and other economic data" by
dominant carriers was necessary to ensure that their tariffs comported with
their statutory responsibilities, it found that the submission of such
supporting information by nondominant carriers was unnecessary and
potentially harmful to the public interest."2 The Commission elaborated:
Because the cost of developing this information is relatively great for
a nondominant carrier, the rates paid by its ultimate users are likely to
be higher than if all competitive carriers were free from this unneces-
sary regulatory burden. Further, the required submission of these data
forces a carrier to reveal to its competitors in advance the fruits of its
own analysis and initiative, thereby discouraging the introduction of
new innovative service offerings."'
This requirement also gave competitors the opportunity to use
Commission procedures to harass each other "by permitting challenges not
to the merits of the [tariff] filing but to the technical details of the
accompanying cost support materials."". For these reasons, the Commis-
sion exempted nondominant carriers from its rules mandating the submis-
sion of these materials." 5
3. Shortened Notice Periods for Tariff Filings
The Commission found that the traditional ninety-day notice period for
tariff filings impeded competition among nondominant carriers." 6
Competition demands "flexibility" and a mandatory three-month delay in
the effectiveness of new services and rates substantially reduced nondomi-
nant carriers' versatility to respond quickly to changing market condi-
tions."7 The Commission therefore eliminated nearly 85 percent of that
delay, allowing nondominant carrier tariffs to become effective on fourteen-
day notice.' In doing so, it dismissed claims that such a short period
111. See id. para. 99.
112. See id. paras. 97-102.
113. Id. para. 99.
114. Id. (footnote omitted.)
115. See id. para. 101.
116. See id. paras. 102-06.
117. See id. para. 102.
118. See id. The Commission proffered no evidence suggesting how 14 days, rather than
any other period shorter than 90 days, would address the problems it sought to solve.
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would give the public inadequate time to evaluate the propriety of
nondominant carrier tariffs on the grounds that "complainants do not have
a statutory right to suspension or rejection.""' 9 It nevertheless did not
eliminate the notice requirement because it "recognize[d] that some period
of review may be justified" and wanted to study market performance before
making more substantial changes. 20
4. Facilities Authorizations
The section 214 requirement that common carriers obtain Commission
approval before entering and exiting service markets fulfills several
purposes. It certifies that carriers are acting in the public interest, establishes
carriers' service areas, controls the number of circuits and facilities that
carriers may construct or lease to provide their authorized services, and
ensures that carriers do not arbitrarily discontinue, reduce, or impair their
services in areas that primarily rely on them.' Despite the apparent
applicability of section 214 to all carriers, the Commission determined that
Congress intended to regulate thereunder only carriers possessing market
power.'
In support of this conclusion, the Commission argued that "non-
dominant carriers are unable to sustain the kind of business practices
Congress was concerned about in adopting Section 214."'1 It emphasized
that "Congress enacted section 214 and subsequent amendments to serve
primarily as a protection against excessive expenditures on plant by rate-
base regulated common carriers and against service discontinuance by
carriers in areas where customers had no reasonable alternative service
available."'24 Nondominant carriers, however, had no incentive to
overinvest in facilities because they were not subject to rate-base regula-
tion.'" In addition, because they were competitive and lacked market
power, any termination, reduction, or impairment of service by nondominant
carriers left other carriers ready and willing to fill the resulting service gap
119. See id. para. 104.
120. See id. para. 102. Although the Commission stated that a one-day notice period had
"some appeal," it postponed serious consideration of that option. See id. para. 105.
121. Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, par. 64 (1979).
122. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 114-16, 52 Rad. Reg
2d (P & F) 215.
123. See id. para. 114.
124. Id.
125. Competitive Carrier Notice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 66. Even if they were
subject to such regulation, the Commission pointed out that these "carriers do not possess
sufficient control over price to recognize any reward from overbuilding." Id.
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with their reasonably substitutable services.126 Under these circumstances,
the Commission concluded that traditional section 214 regulation of
nondominant carriers was inappropriate.
Although this reasoning justified the elimination of all section 214
regulation of nondominant carriers, the Commission instead adopted
streamlined section 214 regulations to govern them.'27 These new
regulations authorized nondominant carriers to serve the entire continental
United States once they received initial certification from the Commis-
sion," required them to report circuit additions to the Commission
semiannually rather than at each instance, 2 9 and relaxed the procedures
they had to follow in order to terminate, reduce, or impair service.'
3
These regulations also exempted from section 214 certification all carriers
that relayed video and audio signals over terrestrial radio facilities or by
satellite pursuant to authorizations previously granted in accordance with
Title III of the Communications Act."' Streamlined section 214 regulation
126. Id. para. 67. Even when a carrier possessed a monopoly in a small geographic region
or over a specific service route, it could still be classified as a nondominant carrier because
of low barriers to market entry. See id.
127. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 117-47, 52 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 215.
128. Id. para. 133. The Commission adopted this rule to eliminate carriers' filing burdens
as they expanded their service areas following their initial certification. Id. It pointed out that
it limited this rule to the continental United States because it had not yet considered whether
domestic offshore points raised unique concerns. Id. If it found that they did not, it intended
to extend this policy to include them. Id. In the meantime, the Commission required
nondominant carriers to apply for additional certification to serve such areas as well as to
construct interstate nonradio transmission media in excess of 10 miles. Id. Eventually, in the
Third Report, the Commission extended this rule's coverage to domestic offshore points. See
Competitive Carrier Third Report, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791, 46,792-93 (1983); see also supra
note 95.
129. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 138-42, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215. The Commission retained the right to demand supplemental information, but
stated that this limited reporting requirement would ease carriers' as well as its own burdens.
Id.
130. See id. paras. 143-47. Under these new rules, the Commission would "ordinarily
automatically grant' nondominant carriers' requests to terminate, reduce, or impair service
30 days after it received them. Id. In their requests, carriers had to describe their proposed
changes in service, identify when and where those changes would take effect, and set forth
the dates and methods of notice to affected customers. Id. The Commission reserved the
right to delay the discontinuation of service when "an unreasonable degree of customer
hardship would result." Id. para. 147. Although these procedures imposed some burden on
nondominant carriers, it was less severe than the burden imposed on dominant carriers
through traditional section 214 regulation. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
131. Id. paras. 133-37. The Commission believed that including satellite transmissions
within this streamlined section 214 regulation was consistent with its classification of
Domsats as dominant carriers. See id. para. 137. It pointed out that "[g]iven [the] inherent
flexibility in satellite communications, a requirement for prior circuit-by-circuit section 214
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therefore gave nondominant carriers greater flexibility in providing services.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPETITIVE CARRIER APPROACH
A. The Initial Formulation and Application of Forbearance
The Commission suggested at the outset of Competitive Carrier that
its adoption of streamlined regulation for nondominant carriers was only an
interim step in its development of a comprehensive approach to regulate
competition in the interexchange market.' At that time, it postulated that
it had "discretion to forbear from the exercise of its full regulatory authority
under the [Communications] Act."'3 The fundamental principle underly-
ing forbearance, like streamlined regulation, was that Title II regulations
were "unnecessary and counterproductive" in a competitive market.'
4
Although the Commission had not decided whether to adopt a forbearance
policy by the time it released the First Report,'35 it had done so nearly
two years later when it released the Second Report."6
The Second Report set forth the Commission's initial forbearance
policy, which focused on the Title II requirements that common carriers file
tariffs with the Commission and receive Commission authorization before
entering and exiting service markets. The Commission found that section
203's "tariff regulation of non-dominant carriers is at odds with the purposes
of the Act because it inhibits price competition, service innovation and the
ability of firms to respond quickly to market trends.' ' 137 The Commission
similarly determined that in a competitive market, section 214's "entry and
exit requirements do little to serve the purposes of the Act and ... [instead]
actually deterred the introduction of innovative and useful services as well
authorizations would only delay or inhibit satellite service to customers without any
countervailing regulatory benefits." Id. Consequently, it "concluded that a separate section
214 certification requirement applicable only to video and on a transponder by transponder
or circuit-by-circuit basis can also be removed for domestic satellite carriers where present
procedures result in duplicative regulation." Id.
132. See Competitive Carrier Notice ofinquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, para. 97.
133. Id. para. 99.
134. See id. para. 97; Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para. 15, 52
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982). The Commission subsequently noted that "[forbearance
involves less disclosure to competitors of carders' rates and tariff conditions than streamlined
regulation [and,] [c]onsequently, forbearance eliminates a potential vehicle for collusive
conduct and facilitates price discounting." Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d
554, 556 n.3, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1219 (1983).
135. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 4, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 215.
136. See Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para. 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 187.
137. Id. para. 12.
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as new market entrants."' 38 On these grounds, the Commission concluded
that allowing nondominant carriers to forego compliance with these two
sections was "appropriate."'139
The Commission offered its legal justification for such forbearance
from tariff and facilities regulation in the Further Notice, which preceded
the Second Report.4 ' There, the Commission asserted that section
203(b)(2) gave it discretion to "modify" any of the tariff filing require-
ments. '4 Despite the lack of similar language in section 214 and the
Commission's recognition that its "authority with respect to total forbear-
ance from 214 regulation of competitive carriers remains unanswered," the
Commission found that forbearance from facilities regulation was consistent
with the "overriding goals of the [Communications] Act.' 14  It later
justified forbearance from facilities regulation on the grounds that "[tihe
Communications Act does not specify the amount or type of information to
be obtained from applications or procedures under Section 214(a)."'4 3
While the rationale underlying the Commission's determination in
favor of permissive forbearance seemingly applied to all nondominant
carriers, the Second Report limited the policy to terrestrial resellers of basic
communication services for three reasons.1" First, the Commission
decided to test forbearance on these carriers because of its previous
favorable regulatory experience with them. It noted that it "had few, if any,
occasions to reject, suspend, or even investigate tariff filings for resale
services [and that] rarely, if ever, [has it] had occasion to deny or condition
reseller applications for facilities certification pursuant to Section 214.''
It found that under these circumstances traditional Title II regulation of
resale carriers was "especially onerous."'4 6 Second, the hundreds of
138. Id. In Further Notice, the Commission suggested that its forbearance policy might
exempt nondominant carriers from the traditional common carrier obligation to provide
service to any creditworthy customer on reasonable request. See Competitive Carrier Further
Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 70 (1981).
139. See Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, paras. 12,30,52 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 187.
140. See Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, paras. 87-119.
141. Id. para. 88. For the text of section 203(b)(2), see infra note 302 and accompanying
text.
142. See id. para. 117.
143. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 38 & 580 n.84, 56
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1219 (1983) (citing ITT World Comm. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 897, 900
(2d Cir. 1979)).
144. Some comments submitted to the Commission suggested that resale carriers were
not common carriers, but rather were "private carriers" exempt from Title II regulation. See
Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para. 10, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187.
145. Id. para. 5.
146. Id.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
applications seeking permission to offer terrestrial resale services filed after
the Commission's decision to authorize the unlimited resale of MTS and
WATS services'47 and the low capital requirements necessary to com-
mence providing those services confirmed the competitiveness of the resale
market. 4 Third, the application of forbearance to terrestrial resale carriers
had "evoked the least controversy." '49 This limited application of forbear-
ance, however, was short-lived.
B. The Extension of Forbearance
One year after it released the Second Report, the Commission
reevaluated its application of permissive forbearance to only terrestrial
resale carriers. The Commission pointed out in the Fourth Report150 that,
since it had adopted streamlined regulation for nondominant carriers, there
had been "no evidence that it is in the public interest for [it] to continue...
receiving tariff and Section 214 filings from certain [SCCs] to prevent them
from charging unjust or unreasonable rates or making service unavail-
able.'' Consequently, the Commission found no need to regulate SCCs
and terrestrial resale carriers differently and included SCCs within its
forbearance policy."2
147. Id. para. 6; see also In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use
of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network Services, Report and Order, 83
F.C.C.2d 167 (1980).
148. See Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, paras. 6, 16, 52 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 187.
149. Id. para. 7. For example, rather than oppose forbearance for resale carriers, AT&T
requested permission to offer its own unregulated resale services through a separate
subsidiary. See id. at 63 n.13, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 220 n.13. AT&T nevertheless
argued that, while reducing unnecessary regulation for all carriers was appropriate, the
Commission was exceeding its discretion because Congress intended the regulation of all
carriers regardless of their market power. Id. para. 9 (Southern Pacific Communications
Corporation (Sprint) and others agreed). Some carriers "agree[d] in principle" with the
Commission's deregulatory efforts, but favored retention of certain Title II regulations. See
id. at 63 n.13.
150. For a discussion of the Third Report, released less than one month before the Fourth
Report, see supra notes 96 and 128.
151. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 36, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1219 (1983) (footnote omitted). The Commission noted that it only had received five
challenges to SCC tariff filings and a "couple" of baseless oppositions to SCC service
terminations. Id. at 578 n.79, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d at 1237 n.79. Although it stated that continued
tariff and facilities regulation of "certain" SCCs was no longer necessary, the Commission
apparently erroneously used the word "certain" because it extended permissive forbearance
to all SCCs in the Fourth Report.
152. See id. para. 36. The Commission included GTE Sprint with the other SCCs subject
to forbearance because it was a structurally separate affiliate of GTE, a dominant telephone
carrier, under the GTE consent decree. Id. at 579 n.80, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1237
n.80.; see also United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984) (approving
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The Commission also reclassified as nondominant all remaining resale
carriers, "including domsat resellers, resellers owned by or affiliated with
an exchange telephone company, and domestic record-carrier resellers not
covered by the interconnection requirements of the Record Carrier
Competition Act [of 1981]," and applied permissive forbearance to them as
well. 53 It determined that all resale carriers were particularly suited for
forbearance because, unlike other nondominant carriers, they did not own
their communications facilities, could not control the use of the underlying
communications facilities in a manner that was inconsistent with the public
interest, and by necessity could not exceed the rates charged by their
underlying carriers.'m
C. The Reclassification of Carriers
Concurrent with its extension of permissive forbearance to all SCCs
and resale carriers, the Commission reconsidered its classification of certain
dominant carriers in the Fourth Report in order to make it possible to
extend forbearance to some or all of them in the future. 55 To justify this
reclassification, the Commission conducted an extensive market power
analysis of the telecommunications industry and offered a more thorough
explanation of the dangers of market power to support its regulatory
approach than it had earlier in Competitive Carrier.'56
The Commission examined two aspects of market power. First, it
noted that a firm with market power has 'the ability to raise prices by
restricting output"' and thereby increase its profits at the expense of its
customers, who have no option except to pay higher prices for the scarce.
goods and services they require." A firm without market power, by
consent decree permitting GTE to acquire the Sprint long distance telephone service from
Southern Pacific Communications Corporation).
153. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 35, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1219. In the Record Carrier Competition Act of 1981, Congress ordered the
Commission to "promote the development of fully competitive domestic and international
markets in the provision of record communications service, so that the public may obtain
record communications service and facilities (including terminal equipment) the variety and
price of which are governed by competition." See 47 U.S.C. § 222(b)(I) (1994). "The term
'record communications service' means those services traditionally offered by telegraph
companies, such as telegraph, telegram, telegram exchange, and similar services involving
an interconnected network of teletypewriters:' 47 U.S.C. § 222(a)(3) (repealed 1994).
154. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 35, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1219.
155. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
156. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, paras. 6-30, 56 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1219.
157. Id. para. 7 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
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contrast, cannot behave similarly and achieve such a self-serving result
because its action would not significantly diminish the market's total output
and lead to a price increase.'58 Second, the Commission observed that
"market power focuses on the ability to raise and maintain price above the
competitive level without driving away so many customers as to make the
increase unprofitable."' 5 9 It pointed out, however, that it considered
monopoly profits and not economic rents as evidence of market power. 6
Once it set forth this understanding of market power, the Commission
undertook the task of defining the relevant product and geographic markets
in which to apply it.'
The Commission defined the relevant product market at issue in
Competitive Carrier as "all interstate, domestic, interexchange telecommu-
nications services" and did not recognize any relevant submarkets.'6 It
found that voice, data, record, and video telecommunications services could
be transmitted in many diverse ways, such as through the terrestrial
microwave systems of MCCs, the satellite services of Domsats and Domsat
resellers, the expanding high capacity facilities of SCCs, and the vast
national network of AT&T. 6 It also found that consumers often
substituted from "MTSWATS to private line and public switched record
services" and "that, within very broad limits, telecommunications transmis-
sion media-wire pairs, coaxial cable, terrestrial microwave, fiber optics, or
satellite transponders and earth stations--can be adjusted readily to provide
virtually any service efficiently."'" Under these circumstances, the
Commission held that this compelling evidence of supply and demand
substitutability validated its definition of the relevant product market.' 6
Consistent with its broad definition of the relevant product market, the
Commission defined the relevant geographic market to include the entire
158. Id.
159. Id. para. 8.
160. See id. paras. 8-12. The Commission distinguished between monopoly profits, which
generally result from a firm's ability to limit market output artificially, and economic rents,
which generally result from a firm's acquisition of a scarce resource at a cost below its
current market value. See id. para. 8. It concluded that "regulation of firms that can earn
economic rents does not promote the public interest in efficient allocation of resources as
may regulation of firms able to earn monopoly profits by restricting output [because it] does
not increase output; does not decrease prices to consumers when unregulated intermediate
suppliers are present; and can create difficult allocation problems and resulting inefficien-
cies." Id. para. 12.
161. See id. paras. 13-30.
162. Id. para. 14.
163. See id. para. 17.
164. Id. paras. 15-16 (footnote omitted).
165. Id.
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United States and its territories and again did not recognize any relevant
submarkets.'6 It observed that "[tihe relevant geographic market includes
the locations of the suppliers (1) to which buyers in any one area practica-
bly can turn for alternative sources of supply, or (2) which otherwise check
the prices charged to those buyers." 6' It pointed out that customers had
substantial supply substitutability because they had the option of using, for
example, the many nationwide services of AT&T, the flexible satellite
offerings of Domsats and Domsat resellers, and the developing networks of
SCCs. 168 It also noted that customers had substantial demand substitutabil-
ity because they had the ability to shop among numerous carriers in order
to find the best price and service alternatives.' 69 Because supply and
demand "cannot be segmented into distinct city pairs or even regions,"'
70
the Commission concluded that its definition of the geographic market was
appropriate.1
7 1
Based on this market power analysis, the Commission determined that
its original classifications, derived from technology-specific criteria," 2
were no longer viable. 3 It conceded that it erroneously had focused on
carriers' market power, without first defining the relevant service markets,
when it devised the Competitive Carrier classification scheme. 74 It
pointed out that, because of the reasonable substitutability of their services
and low barriers to entry, MCCs, Domsats, Domsat resellers, Western
Union's domestic operations, record carriers, SCCs, terrestrial resellers, and
interexchange carriers affiliated with exchange telephone companies each
had shares of the relevant product and geographic markets that were too
small to confer market power on them." 5 All of these carriers, therefore,
166. See id. paras. 25-30.
167. Id. para. 25. The Commission stated that "1locations are included in a relevant
market because either buyers in one area practicably can go there to purchase from a
supplier as an alternative to purchasing from a given firm (demand substitutability), or a
supplier there readily could sell to these buyers by employing existing capacity or develop-
ing new plant (supply substitutability)." Id. (footnote omitted).
168. Id. paras. 26-28.
169. Id. para. 29.
170. Id. para. 26.
171. See id. para. 30.
172. See supra notes 33-79 and accompanying text.
173. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 31, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1219.
174. See supra notes 33-79 and accompanying text.
175. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d para. 31, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1219. The Commission recognized that exchange telephone companies had the ability to
acquire market power in the interstate service market by providing their affiliated interex-
change carriers with more favorable interconnections than their competitors. Id. para. 32. As
a result, it vowed to "scrutinize" such arrangements as well as to maintain Title II regulation
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were now, by definition, nondominant carriers.'76 As a result, only AT&T
and the independent telephone companies remained dominant carriers
subject to traditional Title II regulation.
While the Commission extended permissive forbearance to SCCs and
resale carriers, it applied streamlined regulation to all other nondominant
carriers. Like when it classified SCCs as nondominant and applied
streamlined regulation to them in the First Report, the Commission took this
approach because it wanted to examine these carriers' performance under
streamlined regulation before extending forbearance to them.'" The
Commission intended to impose forbearance "after a carrier's petition when
the costs and benefits of forbearance for that carrier are more attractive than
those of streamlined regulation."'78
D. Carriers With Dominant And Nondominant Characteristics
As it developed its progressively deregulatory policy toward
nondominant carriers, the Commission also evolved a more liberal approach
to regulating carriers that had a mixture of dominant and nondominant
characteristics. 179 Initially, the Commission adopted a "conservative
approach" to regulate these carriers,' holding that "[a] finding of
dominance [requires] a continuation of [traditional Title II] treatment of all
of the activities of that firm [and that] carriers are eligible for streamlined
regulatory procedures only if they are not dominant in the provision of any
services."' 8 ' Although the Commission retained this rule for "single
entities" that had some nondominant characteristics, it held that it would
regulate dominant carriers' "separate affiliates" as nondominant carriers
of local exchange companies and exchange access tariffs. Id.
176. In the First Report, the Commission had rejected this broad definition of the relevant
product and geographic markets in response to Western Union's opposition to its classifica-
tion as a dominant carrier. See supra notes 50 and 54 and accompanying text. If the
Commission had adopted this market definition then, Western Union would have been
classified initially as a nondominant carrier. See id.
177. See id. para. 37. The Commission expected to review the performance of these new
nondominant carriers within 18 months in order to assess whether continuing streamlined
regulation was appropriate. See id.
178. Id.
179. For example, "a carrier providing international services (subject to full regulation),
domestic record carrier services with international interconnections (subject to streamlined
regulation), and domestic resale services (subject to forbearance)." See Competitive Carrier
Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 17, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
180. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 22 n.55, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
215, at 230 n.55 (1980); see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 22 n.55, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 230 n.55.
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provided that they had only nondominant characteristics.' 82 Such affiliates
would then be subject to streamlined regulation or forbearance depending
upon their individual characteristics." 3 As a result, some nondomlnant
separate affiliates of the same dominant carriers could be subject to
streamlined regulation while others were subject to forbearance.9 4 When
nondominant single entities had a mixture of streamlined regulation and
forbearance characteristics, they would be subject to streamlined regulation
unless they received a Commission waiver.'85 Thus, "for a single entity
with mixed characteristics, all of its services would be subject to the
heaviest burden of regulation applicable to any of its services."'
16
E. The Further Extension Of Forbearance
It took the Commission little time to extend permissive forbearance
again. In its Fifth Report, adopted only nine months after the Fourth Report,
the Commission decided that permissive forbearance was appropriate for
interexchange carriers affiliated with exchange telephone companies," 7
182. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 37, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1219. The Commission did not define "separate affiliate" at this time. It later explained
that, by referring to "separate affiliates," it did not intend to require carriers to establish the
kind of structurally separate subsidiaries ordered in the Second Computer Inquiry. See
Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 RC.C.2d 1191, para. 18, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1204; see also infra note 187. The Commission decided, however, to subject GTE Sprint to
forbearance because it was a "structurally separated affiliate" of GTE. See supra note 152.
183. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 37, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1219.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 17, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1204 (1984). AT&T was the leading example of a carrier with mixed characteristics.
See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 40, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1219.
187. The Commission defined "'affiliate' of an exchange telephone company" as "a
carrier that is owned (in whole or part) or controlled by, or under common ownership (in
whole or part) or control with, an exchange telephone company." Competitive Carrier Fifth
Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 9, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d 1204. Although it acknowledged that
exchange telephone companies with affiliated interexchange carriers had the ability and
incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct, such as cross-subsidization and discriminato-
ry interconnection, the Commission did not find that the total structural separation ordered
in the Second Computer Inquiry was necessary here. See id. Rather, it provided that "an
exchange telephone company's affiliate qualifying for nondominant treatment must have
separate books of account, and must not jointly own transmission or switching facilities with
that exchange telephone company." Id. While it recognized that structural separation had
been imposed successfully on "large exchange telephone companies," it concluded that the
costs could outweigh the benefits if the same requirement applied to "smaller exchange
telephone companies." See id. at 1198 n.23; see also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d
465, 476 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "most of the independent companies, apart from GTE,
are quite small firms that might find it very costly to establish separate subsidiaries"). By
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Domsats,"'8  MCCs,1 9 and digital electronic message service carriers
(DEMS).'9 As a result, all carriers, except AT&T and the independent
telephone companies, had now become subject to permissive forbear-
ance.
19 1
The Commission's explanation for taking this action was similar to its
earlier rationale for extending permissive forbearance. 92 It observed that
forbearance: (1) reduces costs and delays associated with the introduction
of new services or rates, thereby enabling carriers to meet customer needs
more quickly and with less expense, and (2) facilitates and stimulates
competition and innovation by reducing entry barriers, lowering carrier costs
and consumer prices, and minimizing the disclosure of business strategy and
technological information to rivals. 93 It also expressed satisfaction with
the performance of carriers already subject to permissive forbearance, noting
that only minor complaints had been filed against them, as well as with the
performance of interexchange carriers affiliated with exchange telephone
companies, MCCs, and Domsats during the short time they were under
contrast, any exchange telephone company that offered its own "interstate services" was
subject to regulation as a dominant carrier. See Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 9, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d 1204.
188. A Domsat petition for forbearance by waiver filed pursuant to the Fourth Report led
the Commission to consider extending permissive forbearance to all Domsats. See Competi-
tive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 12, 56 Rad. Reg 2d (P & F) 1204.
189. As with the Domsats, an MCC petition for forbearance by waiver filed pursuant to
the Fourth Report led the Commission to consider extending permissive forbearance to all
MCCs. See id. para. 14.
190. DBMS provide high-speed, two-way radio transmissions. See id. para. 19; see also
Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 40, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1219 (1983). In the Fourth Report, the Commission noted that Competitive Carrier had not
considered certain carriers, including DBMS, domestic public land mobile radio services,
public coast maritime mobile radio services, multipoint distribution services, and cellular
mobile radio services, for classification as nondominant carriers. See id. para. 40 & 1240
n.92 ("[p]ursuant to the First Report, resellers of these services are treated by forbearance")(emphasis removed). The Commission provided, however, that these carriers could petition
for such consideration and thereby become subject to streamlined regulation or forbearance
as long as they satisfactorily "address[ed] the relevant product and geographic markets,
supported by factual evidence of demand and supply substitutability, and market power,
supported by factual evidence of the level and change in market shares and entry." See id.
para. 40. It is by this method that the Commission considered DEMS for forbearance treat-
ment. See Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 19, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1204.
191. The Commission rejected a request by AT&T for regulation as a nondominant
carrier. Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1193 n.4, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) at 1206 n.4. MCI and others had opposed AT&T's petition for reclassification. See id.
192. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
193. Competitive Carrier Fifih Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 10, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1204.
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streamlined regulation. 94 In sum, the Commission found that, for these
carriers as well as DEMS,'95 "the costs/benefits of forbearance are more
in the public interest than those of streamlined regulation.' 96
F The Adoption of Mandatory Forbearance
The evolution of Competitive Carrier culminated with the release of
the Sixth Report in January 1985.' 9' The Commission announced therein
that "the public interest and the goals of the Communications Act would
best be promoted by cancellation of all forborne carrier tariffs on file at the
Commission within six months of the effective date of this Order"'98 and
therefore implemented this policy.'9 Rebuffing allegations that it was
194. Id.
195. In extending permissive forbearance to DEMS, the Commission noted that DEMS
would have close substitutes from the other carriers offering domestic, interstate,
interexchange data, voice, record, and video services, that DEMS were a novelty and would
have only a "minuscule" market share, that DEMS faced competition from established
carriers and other methods of transmission, and that no oppositions to any DEMS tariffs or
formal complaints regarding any DEMS service had been filed. Id. paras. 19-26. The
Commission also found that forbearance particularly benefits new carriers, like DEMS,
because often "it is more costly for a new carrier to prepare and file its first tariff than any
subsequent tariff." Id. para. 23. Despite the apparent applicability of forbearance to all
DEMS services, however, the Commission determined that it would regulate the DEMS
services of exchange telephone companies as services of dominant carriers unless those
companies offered such services through affiliated carriers. Id. para. 18.
196. Id. para. 14; see also id. paras. 13-14, 23. The Commission noted, however, that it
was "[un]able to quantify the benefits and costs discussed" in the Fifth Report, but
"believe[d] that they are substantial." Id at 1199 n.24, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 121-0
n.24. These carriers still had to file semi-annual reports on circuits in order to provide the
Commission with information necessary to adopt regulations which ensured that the
telecommunications industry was serving the public interest, and to comply with Title III of
the Communications Act. See id. paras. 11, 14, 23.
197. The Sixth Report only addressed section 203's tariff-filing requirements and did not
pertain to section 214's facilities authorization requirements. Competitive Carrier Sixth
Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, paras. 1-26, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391 (1985).
198. Id. para. 2 (footnote omitted).
199. Id. paras. 23-27. The Commission ordered all forborne carriers to file supplements
canceling their tariffs within six months and all carriers with mixed tariffs either to cancel
their tariffs and file new ones only relating to services covered by traditional Title II or
streamlined regulation or to issue revisions canceling the provisions relating to services
subject to forbearance. Id. para. 23. The Commission would not accept new tariffs from
forborne carriers, but would allow revisions to tariffs that had not yet been canceled. Id.
para. 24. In place of tariffs, the Commission required all forborne carriers to "maintain at
their premises price and service information" and "copies of service contract and documen-
tation of agreements and arrangements with all customers" in order to ensure that all carrier
actions were consistent with the Communications Act and to facilitate the investigation of
complaints. Id. para. 25.
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"abdicating its oversight responsibility with regard to forborne carriers,"2"
the Commission asserted that this decision advanced its regulatory
objectives "to assure that communications service is widely available to the
public, efficiently produced and reasonably priced," ' was consistent with
its 'broad discretion in choosing how to regulate,"'2 2 and was the next
logical step following the three successful years it had experienced
employing permissive forbearance.2 3
The Commission cited three statutory grounds as support for its
imposition of mandatory forbearance. First, reiterating its rationale for
adopting permissive forbearance,2 the Commission stated that Title II,
which Congress enacted "to control monopoly abuse or imprudent
investments by the carriers which could impose increased costs on
consumers," was inapplicable to nondominant carriers because they lack the
market power necessary to engage in the conduct it regulates.205 Second,
the Commission asserted that section 203(b)(2) grants it "express authority
to exempt carriers from tariff filing requirements where appropriate" by
allowing it "to modify any requirement of the section."206 Finally, the
Commission cited the "broad exemptive language" of section 203(c)(1) as
"authority for forborne carrier tariff cancellation."2 7 Thus, according to
the Commission, its imposition of mandatory forbearance was a legitimate
exercise of its broad statutory discretion to regulate the telecommunications
industry in the public interest.
Although the Commission cited no negative impact on competition
from section 214's facilities authorization requirements, it nevertheless
concluded that tariff filing by nondominant carriers pursuant to section 203
200. Id. para. 11. The opponents of mandatory forbearance included MCI and GTE
Sprint. Id. at 1023 n.9, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1394 n.9 (citing MCI's position that "a
tariff rate is the only legal rate").
201. Id. para. 12.
202. Id. (footnote omitted).
203. Id. para. 16. AT&T supported mandatory forbearance on the grounds that nondomi-
nant carriers "cannot have 'the trappings of regulatory approval without the regulatory
supervision."' Id. para. 10 (quoting AT&T's comments at page 1); cf. Phonetele, Inc. v.
AT&T, 664 F.2d 716, 733 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the Commission does not approve or
adopt a tariff by allowing it to go into effect). In sum, AT&T argued that nondominant
carriers cannot enjoy the benefits of competition without bearing the attendant responsibili-
ties and costs. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 10, 57 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1391 (1985).
204. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
205. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, at 1028-29 n.29, 57 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) at 1398 n.29.
206. Id. para. 12.
207. Id.
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needlessly encouraged anticompetitive behavior. 8 Tariff filing had the
potential to harm carriers and the public by '(1) taking away carriers'
ability to make rapid, efficient responses to changes in demand and cost; (2)
impeding and removing incentives for competitive price discounting; (3)
imposing costs on carriers that attempt to make new offerings; and (4)
increasing the costs of the Commission's operation.""'2  The Commission
expressed particular concern about the potential for price collusion resulting
from carriers' ability to study the tariffs filed by their competitors,2 ° the
likelihood that its continued supervision of competitive carriers' tariff filings
would result in the wasteful spending of public funds which it could more
appropriately use to monitor dominant carriers,2"' the possibility that tariff
filings would discourage consumers from seeking customized service
arrangements and thereby impede technological innovation,212 and the
chance that its acceptance of tariff filings would mislead other government
agencies into believing that it had approved them." 3 Thus, the Commis-
sion held that mandatory forbearance was necessary because voluntary tariff
filings would, like traditional Title II regulation, impede competition.
G. Safeguards For Abuses
Although the Commission maintained throughout Competitive Carrier
that market forces would discipline nondominant carriers and thereby
advance the goals of its streamlined regulation and forbearance policies,2"4
208. Id. paras. 12-27.
209. Id. para. 13 (quoting Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 1199 n.24,
56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204, 1210 n.24 (1984)).
210. Id. para. 13 (concluding that "[s]ince carriers can ascertain their competitors'existing
rates and keep track of any changes in those rates by reviewing the filed tariffs, carriers may
be encouraged to maintain rates at an artificially high level [while] [w]ithout forborne carrier
tariffs on file, carriers may initiate price cutting or generally institute rates at a lower level
to meet directly customer demand").
211. Id. para. 14 (pointing out that "[m]ere streamlined regulation ofnondominant carriers
does not remove any of the harmful effects and offers the consumers less benefit, and
imposes unnecessary costs on such carriers, their subscribers, and society generally").
212. Id. para. 18 (noting that "[a] tariff may be restrictive because it fosters an image that
all possible service arrangements are defined within its text"). The Commission also stated
that "maintenance of tariffs is likely to inhibit the development of the 'informed consumer'
who diligently studies industry trends," a result that is antithetical to a competitive market.
Id. para. 20.
213. Id. para. 20 (arguing that "[t]he presence of effective tariffs on Commission premises
may suggest that the Commission has, in fact, substantively evaluated them and found no
objection"). But see Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para. 19, 52 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982) (rejecting the notion that Commission regulation or certification
is a "stamp of approval").
214. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 37, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1219 (1983).
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it nevertheless repeatedly asserted that adequate safeguards existed to
protect the public in the unlikely event it was wrong.2 5 For example, it
pointed out that it retained the section 204 right to suspend and investigate
tariff filings by nondominant carriers subject to streamlined regulation.216
Likewise, it argued that it could reimpose both the section 203 tariff-filing
requirements and the section 214 facilities authorization requirements on
forborne carriers that went astray.217 In addition, it noted that it still relied
on the section 208 complaint process and its authority to require carriers to
submit cost data to support their rates as well as to produce documents
setting forth the terms under which they provide services.21 Finally, it
observed that a finding of unlawful acts still subjected nondominant carriers
to damages under sections 206 and 207.219 The Commission therefore
concluded that nondominant carriers' customers "retain[ed] regulatory
protection for those few cases in which they may need it."''- 0
H. The Exclusion of AT&T from Forbearance Treatment
The Commission commenced Competitive Carrier while the federal
government's antitrust action against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell
Laboratories was pending (United States v. AT&Y). 2  Although the
federal government often amended its requests for relief, it consistently
sought the divestiture of some or all of the BOCs from AT&T.2 - That
outcome would fundamentally restructure the telecommunications industry
and facilitate competition by eliminating AT&T's control over critical local
exchange facilities. United States v. AT&T therefore had important
implications for the Commission's Competitive Carrier approach.
1. The Modification of Final Judgment
While the Commission was developing its forbearance policy in
Competitive Carrier,-3 United States v. AT&T concluded with the entry
215. Id. paras. 33-35, 37.
216. Id. para. 33.
217. Id. paras. 33, 36.
218. Id. para. 33.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (filed November 20, 1974,
the complaint alleged the monopolization of "telecommunications services and equipment
in violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act'), affid sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
222. Id. at 139 n.20.
223. Competitive Catier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187
(1982).
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of a consent decree with certain modifications imposed by the presiding
district judge, Harold H. Greene. 24 The "key feature" of this modified
decree, commonly referred to as the Modification ofFinal Judgment (MF'I),
was AT&T's divestiture of the BOCs. Citing the Commission's
historical inability to halt AT&T's allegedly anticompetitive practices
through traditional regulatory policies and the Department of Justice's
previous inability to accomplish that goal in the courts,- 6 Judge Greene
held that divestiture was the most effective remedy then available to
promote the public interest?27 He explained that "[t]his divestiture will
sever the relationship between this local monopoly and the other, competi-
tive segments of AT&T, and it will thus ensure-certainly better than could
any other type of relief-that the practices which allegedly have lain heavy
on the telecommunications industry will not recur." ' 8
Judge Greene recognized two significant benefits accruing to AT&T's
competitors, and consequently the public, from divestiture. First, he pointed
out that, in order to preserve its market dominance, AT&T allegedly had
used its control over local exchange facilities to delay, prevent, or otherwise
impair the access of competing long-distance carriers and equipment
manufacturers to the overwhelming majority of American telephone
subscribers2 9 By eliminating AT&T's ability to engage in such discrimi-
natory tactics, divestiture enhanced the viability of AT&T's competitors and
concomitantly expanded the publics service and equipment options.230
Second, he observed that AT&T allegedly had subsidized its competitive
long-distance and equipment enterprises with profits earned from its
monopoly local telephone business. 31 Without the ability to engage in
224. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 222-34. Upon the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act, this consent decree and the consent decree governing GTE and its
operating companies were no longer in effect. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, see. 601(a)(1)-(2), I10 Stat. 56, 143.
225. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160. The AT&T reorganization resulted in
the assignment of the 22 BOCs to seven regional holding companies. Id. at 142 n.41.
226. On January 14, 1949, the federal government filed an antitrust action against
Western Electric and AT&T. Id. at 135. That litigation, which focused on the defendants'
alleged domination of the telecommunications equipment market, ended on January 24,
1956, with the entry of a consent decree that enjoined AT&T from engaging in businesses
other than common carrier communications services, restricted Western Electric to
manufacturing telecommunications equipment only for the Bell System, and required the
defendants to license their patents to all applicants. Id. at 136, 138.
227. Id. at 223.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. AT&T also allegedly shifted costs from its competitive businesses to its
monopoly local telephone service, thereby enabling it to underprice its competition and
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
this cross-subsidization, all firms gained the opportunity to compete on
equal terms with AT&T, offering the public legitimate telecommunications
alternatives. 32
To enable AT&T to compete in this manner without creating the risk
that it could successfully resume predatory behavior, Judge Greene
fashioned the MFJ so that AT&T's monopoly power over local exchanges
would be transferred to the divested BOCs. This arrangement required the
imposition of substantial restrictions on the BOCs to ensure that they had
neither the ability nor the incentive to engage in the same anticompetitive
conduct that led to United States v. AT&T and necessitated the MFJ. 33
These restrictions, subject to removal upon the petition of one or more
BOCs,2 34 included a prohibition against the provision of interexchange
services."3 5 In addition, to guarantee that AT&T and other firms competed
on equal terms, the MFJ prohibited the BOCs from "discriminat[ing]
between AT&T and its affiliates and their products and services and other
persons and their products and services'236 and required the BOCs to
"provide to all interexchange carriers and information service providers
exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access
on an unbundled, tariffed basis, that is equal in type, quality, and price to
that provided to AT&T and its affiliates. '23 7 Thus, these restrictions made
clear that while AT&T was a "competitive" carrier under the M-FJ, the
BOCs were not.
recoup the shifted costs through its rate-based regulation. Id. at 172.
232. Id. at 223.
233. Id. at 224. BOCs could provide service only in "Local Access and Transport Areas"
(LATAs), defined as "one or more contiguous local exchange areas serving common social,
economic, and other purposes, even where such configuration transcends municipal or other
local governmental boundaries." Id. at 229. BOCs therefore could provide service that was
traditionally "long distance" as long as it was within their assigned LATA. Id.
234. To obtain the removal of a restriction, a BOC had to show "that there is no substan-
tial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it
seeks to enter." Id. at 225; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1995) (granting BOCs' motion to modify section II(D) of the MFJ, subject to certain
conditions, in order to allow them to provide cellular and other wireless services across
LATA boundaries).
235. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. The Telecommunications Act expressly
provides for BOC entry into the interexchange market. See Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, see. 151, §§ 271-76, 110 Stat. 56, 86-107. It departs from the MFJby
allowing BOCs to offer "out-of-region" and "incidental" interLATA services immediately,
but retains the spirit of the MFJ by imposing numerous restrictions that BOCs must satisfy
before they can offer "in-region" interLATA services. Id. see. 151, § 271(b)-(c), Ci), 110
Stat. at 86-89.
236. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
237. Id.
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2. The Significance of AT&T's Large Market Share
According to Judge Greene, AT&T lacked monopoly power in the
interexchange market even though it had received more than three-quarters
of the revenue generated in that market as late as 1981.238 He pointed out
that while "monopoly power may be inferred from a firm's predominant
share of the market, size alone is not synonymous with market power,
particularly where entry barriers are not substantial." 9 Because of the
divestiture, which eliminated AT&T's ability to provide discriminatory
interconnection and to engage in cross-subsidization, and technological
developments, which allowed market entry with relatively small capital
expenditures, barriers to enter the interexchange market were not substan-
tial.240 As a result, Judge Greene anticipated that market forces would
drive prices down to competitive levels if AT&T attempted to engage in
monopoly pricing?4 He therefore concluded that, despite its large market
share, "AT&T should be unable to engage in monopoly pricing in any
market.' 2
42
3. United States v. AT&T and Competitive Carrier
In devising its Competitive Carrier policies, the Commission gave
little consideration to United States v. AT&T.2 43 Although that litigation
had been in progress for nearly five years when Competitive Carrier com-
menced, the Commission did not even mention it until the Fourth Report,
released more than one year after Judge Greene entered the MFJ.2 At
that time, the Commission only noted that the regulatory policies promul-
238. Id. at 171. AT&T admitted that its share of interexchange revenues at that time was
approximately 77 percent while others asserted that its market share actually exceeded 90
percent. Id. at 171 n.170.
239. Id. at 171. Judge Greene noted that "monopoly power" is "'the power to control
prices or exclude competition."' Id. (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571 (1966)).
240. Id. at 171-72. Examples of technological innovation that facilitated competition cited
by Judge Greene included the development of satellites and microwave transmission. Id. at
172 n. 173. Judge Greene noted that the growing resale and sharing of AT&T's services also
promoted competition. Id.
241. Id. at 172. Judge Greene acknowledged that AT&T was the only interexchange
carrier on certain routes, some of which were less profitable rural routes. Id. He did not
believe, however, that AT&T would monopolize prices in those instances, even if some of
those routes became lucrative, because such action would encourage other firms to enter
those markets. Id.
242. Id.
243. See generally infra note 253.
244. See Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 557 n.6, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1219, 1221 n.6 (1983).
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gated in Competitive Carrier would not apply to the BOCs' interstate
intraLATA services until the BOCs faced substantial competition in those
services, 245 that AT&T controlled approximately 77 percent of the
interexchange market in 198 l,2' and that AT&T received the overwhelm-
ing share of toll service revenues in 1982.247 Subsequently, in the Fifth
Report, the Commission acknowledged that the MFJ limited the BOCs'
ability to offer interexchange services2 48 and stated that it would regulate
the BOCs' interstate interLATA services as dominant, whenever Judge
Greene removed the MFJprohibition against BOCs providing such services,
until it determined whether structural separation from their monopoly local
telephone businesses would qualify those services for nondominant
treatment.2 49 Finally, in the Sixth Report, the Commission observed that
the MFJ and its own decisions "drastically" changed the telecommunica-
tions industry during the half-century since Congress passed the Communi-
cations Act.250 Despite these few references to United States v. AT&T,
however, the Commission otherwise ignored that litigation for purposes of
Competitive Carrier.
The Commission's failure to rely on United States v. AT&T while
formulating its Competitive Carrier policies has two possible explanations.
First, the Commission may have felt contempt for the entire proceeding.
The federal government's determination that it was necessary to file such a
lawsuit, Judge Greene's opinion, and the MFJ were all evidence of the
Commission's inability over the years to restrain AT&T from engaging in
anticompetitive activities. Reliance on any facet of that litigation under
these circumstances would have constituted an admission by the Commis-
sion of its own shortcomings. Second, the Commission may have concluded
that United States v. AT&T was too narrow in scope and therefore had little
relevance to the regulatory goals it sought to achieve in Competitive
Carrier. United States v. AT&T considered only the terms under which
AT&T and the BOCs were to operate. In contrast, the Commission
undertook Competitive Carrier to establish rules for governing the conduct
of all telecommunications carriers. 251' To accomplish this goal, the
245. Id.
246. Id. at 575 n.69, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1235 n.69.
247. Id.
248. Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 1197 n.20, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1204, 1209 n.20 (1984).
249. Id. at 1198-99 n.23, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d at 1210 n.23.
250. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1029 n.33, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1391, 1398 n.33 (1985).
251. But see Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 40, 56 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1219 (1983) (pointing out that Competitive Carrier did not originally involve
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Commission accounted for AT&T and the BOCs through its classification
and regulatory treatment of all telephone companies as dominant carri-
ers. - Because United States v. AT&T did not involve all carriers or
establish a regulatory framework for the entire interexchange market, the
Commission most likely viewed Competitive Carrier as a complement to
the MFJ. In essence, Competitive Carrier was the Commission's "MFJ" for
the entire telecommunications industry.
4. Assessing Competitive Carrier's View of United States v.
AT&T
Even though Competitive Carrier was more comprehensive than the
MFJ, the Commission's failure to account for the MFJ's impact on AT&T
made suspect the principles underlying its policies to regulate competition
in the interexchange market.' 3 AT&T was by far the largest, and
therefore the most important, telecommunications firm in the United States
at the time of the MFJ Z 4 A major change in AT&T's corporate structure,
such as the divestiture of the BOCs, necessarily affected the way all
telecommunications firms conducted business. Nonetheless, the Commission
never addressed whether such a change required it to reevaluate the criteria
on which it based its Competitive Carrier classification scheme.
The Commission originally determined that "AT&T must be treated
as dominant' because it controlled the network access of more than 80
percent of American telephone subscribers through its ownership of the
"providers of domestic public land mobile radio services, public coast maritime mobile radio
services, multipoint distribution services, digital electronic message services, and cellular
mobile radio services"); see also supra note 34.
252. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
253. In October 1983, the Commission sought comments on "the appropriate long-run
regulation of AT&T's basic interstate services under the policies of the Communications Act
of 1934 and the statutory obligation of th[e] Commission." In re Long-Run Regulation of
AT&T's Basic Domestic Interstate Services, Notice of Inquiry, 95 F.C.C.2d 510 (1983)
[hereinafter AT&T Notice of Inquiry]. The Commission commenced the AT&T Notice of
Inquiry in order to, among other things, address "fundamental changes in the telecommuni-
cations marketplace," such as the AT&T divestiture. Id. para. 2. The Commission intended
"to look into the future and begin the public policy discussion" regarding the course it
should take to regulate AT&T in the public interest, but did not seek to adopt any deregula-
tory policies immediately. Id. para. 1. Nevertheless, nearly seven years later, the Commission
terminated this proceeding without adopting a new regulatory approach to AT&T. See In re
Long-Run Regulation of AT&T's Basic Domestic Interstate Services, Order, 5 FCC Rcd.
5411 (1990). Ironically, the Commission took this action for the same reason it commenced
the AT&T Notice of Inquiry, the "fundamental changes that have taken place in the
telecommunications industry since the proceeding was initiated." Id. para. 1. The
Commission cited the MFJ as evidence of these changes. Id. para. 3.
254. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Competitive Carrier Fourth
Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 17, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1219.
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most vital local exchange "bottlenecks., 2 55 Following the divestiture,
however, AT&T no longer owned these local exchanges and consequently
controlled no essential bottleneck facilities 6 Although the Commission
acknowledged that the MFJ contributed to the restructuring of the
telecommunications industry,257 it never explained in Competitive Carrier
how AT&T remained a dominant carrier when the conditions on which it
based that classification had ceased to exist.2 58
The Commission also maintained throughout Competitive Carrier that
AT&T had market power in long-distance telephone service because it
enjoyed an "overwhelming share of the MTS and WATS market."z 9 Less
than two years after the Commission first stated this proposition, however,
Judge Greene found that AT&T lacked market power even though it had a
large market share.2' Despite these conflicting conclusions, the Commis-
sion never attempted to reconcile its heavy reliance on market share when
assessing whether AT&T had market power with Judge Greene's rejection
of market share as the decisive factor in that inquiry.
Moreover, after the MFJ took effect, AT&T lacked the ability to
engage in cost-shifting and the incentive to engage in other anticompetitive
conduct. AT&T could not shift costs from its competitive businesses to its
monopoly local telephone exchanges because it no longer controlled these
exchanges. 26' AT&T also had neither the incentive to overprice its
remaining competitive services because it would lose market share to other
firms, nor the incentive to underprice these services because it could never
recoup its losses. The Commission nevertheless still held that "concerns
255. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 62, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 215 (1980); see also supra notes 2, 38-44 and accompanying text.
256. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223, supra notes 229-32 and accompanying
text.
257. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1029 n.33, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1391, 1398 n.33 (1985).
258. The Commission later conceded that, due to the MFJ, "AT&T lost any ability to
discriminate against its long-distance competitors through its control of bottleneck local
interconnection facilities." In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, para. 39, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1010
(1990) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Interexchange Notice]. The Commission further
admitted that "this control had been a principal basis for [its] classification of AT&T as a
dominant carrier in the Competitive Carrier proceeding." Id.
259. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
215. For an explanation of MTS and WATS services, see supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
260. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 171-72; see supra notes 237-41 and
accompanying text.
261. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223; see supra notes 229-32 and
accompanying text.
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about cost-shifting and anticompetitive conduct lead [it] to regulate all of
the common carrier services of AT&T Communications as dominant at this
time." ' 2 Once again, however, the Commission failed to explain the basis
for this holding.
These failures to explain how AT&T remained a dominant carrier,
even after the M4FJ, constitute admissions by the Commission that
Competitive Carrier established an inadequate framework for regulating
competition in a telecommunications industry lacking a vertically integrated
Bell System. For example, the Commission could have challenged Judge
Greene's analysis and argued that traditional Title II regulation of AT&T
was still necessary, despite the MFJ, on the grounds that AT&T's large
share of the interexchange market gave it "the ability to raise prices by
restricting output. 2 63 By not making such a market power argument,
however, the Commission gave no justification for its continued dominant
classification of AT&T. Hence, the Commission's retention of that
classification, with its attendant traditional Title II regulation, had no
obvious legal or factual basis. Under these circumstances, the Commission's
own rationale suggested that mandatory forbearance from tariff and facilities
regulation was appropriate for all interexchange carriers, including AT&T.
V. THE EFFECTS OF FORBEARANCE
Forbearance was a rational, though not flawless, approach to facilitate
the development of competition in the interexchange market. Its effects
were far-reaching, touching nondominant and dominant carriers, the
Commission, and the public.
A. The Impact of Forbearance on Nondominant Carriers
1. Cost Savings for Nondominant Carriers
One of the primary benefits offered to nondominant carriers by
forbearance was the opportunity to save certain costs. The costs related to
defending tariff filings were among the most significant. The Commission
noted:
262. Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 18, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1204 (footnote omitted). The Commission noted that the basic services of AT&T
Information Systems, which was structurally separate from AT&T Communications, were
subject to forbearance. Id. para. 18 nA0.
263. Competitive Carrier Fourth Report, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 7, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1219 (1983) (citing 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 322 (1978)); see
also Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 15, 54, 56, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1980 and supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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The requirement that firms file tariffs, in practice, immediately subjects
them to petitions from competitors for rejection or suspension and
investigation of the tariffs. Should a competitor be successful in
persuading the regulatory agency to order a hearing, the firm can face
substantial legal costs in defending its proposed prices. As a result, it
may find it less expensive to withdraw the new rate.
26
Because forbearance abolished their duty to file tariffs, nondominant carriers
no longer had to endure the challenges to tariff filings that competitors
made in an effort to raise their rivals' costs and delay the availability of
their rivals' new rates and services. The resources saved by not having to
defend tariff filings could be substantial, particularly for carriers that often
filed new or revised tariffs.
Forbearance from the section 214 facilities authorization requirements
also offered nondominant carriers significant cost savings. These carriers no
longer had to submit to the Commission applications that satisfied the
"public convenience and necessity" standard in order to obtain permission
to enter or exit service areas.265 Instead, forbearance gave them flexibility
to enter lucrative markets as soon as practicable and to exit unprofitable
markets whenever appropriate. Thus, forbearance allowed these carriers to
forego the expense of preparing section 214 applications and to avoid
unacceptable losses from having to serve unprofitable areas.
Less significant were the cost savings resulting from forborne carriers
not having to prepare and file tariffs. Most of the tariff costs incurred by
carriers related to the preparation of their first tariffs.2" Consequently,
nondominant carriers that had not yet offered tariffed services, but had
intended to do so, enjoyed the greatest savings as a result of forbearance.
All nondominat carriers, however, still had to gather for their own use
much of the same economic data and other information, which they
previously had submitted to the Commission to support their tariff filings,
in order to assess whether existing and proposed services were economically
viable and to determine appropriate charges and terms for such services.
Forbearance, therefore, did not offer most nondominant carriers meaningful
cost benefits in this regard.
264. Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 25 (1981). Although the
Commission has no statutory authority to prohibit carriers from challenging rivals' tariffs or
to require that carriers demonstrate harm to consumers through the filing of joint carrier-
consumer petitions, the Commission could lobby Congress for such power on the grounds
that these challenges ordinarily have anticompetitive motives and effects. To date, the
Commission apparently has not done so.
265. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1994).
266. Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 23, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1204.
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2. New Costs for Nondominant Carriers
Forbearance also created certain new costs for nondominant carriers
that at least partially offset their cost savings. By abolishing their duty to
set forth their services, rates, and service terms in tariffs, forbearance
required nondominant carriers to negotiate service contracts with their
customers. Consequently, while tariffs simplified nondominant carriers' task
by specifying the kinds of services offered, the prices for them, and the
terms under which they were available, forbearance complicated matters by
requiring nondominant carriers to tailor their service offerings to the
individual needs of their customers or risk losing business. The transaction
costs for negotiating agreements on an individual basis, therefore, were
potentially high.267
B. The Impact of Forbearance on Dominant Carriers
1. Dominant Carriers at a Competitive Disadvantage
The Commission neither stated nor suggested in Competitive Carrier
that it intended for its forbearance policies to place dominant carriers at a
competitive disadvantage. Rather, the Commission implied that forbearance,
coupled with the continued traditional Title II regulation of dominant
carriers, would neutralize dominant carriers' market power and enable all
carriers to compete on equal terms. Contrary to this goal, however,
forbearance allowed nondominant carriers to exploit their exemption from
Title II regulation to the detriment of dominant carriers and the public.
Forbearance inadvertently encouraged nondominant carriers to abuse
the right, conferred on all members of the public by section 204, to
challenge tariff filings by lodging complaints with the Commission.
Nondominant carriers could file these complaints "[w]henever [other firms]
filed with the Commission any new or revised charge, classification,
regulation, or practice."26 Nondominant carriers therefore had a statutory
267. Some carriers argued that they "would sustain increased administrative costs to
negotiate contracts with individual customers and to replace certain protections that they
believe the tariff filing process ... affords them." Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 6, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391 (1985); see also id. para. 17 (pointing
out that "[wjith the tariff mechanism no longer available, carriers accustomed to dealing with
their customers by tariff rather than by other methods traditionally used by non-regulated
businesses might perceive some increased administrative burdens, at least initially"). In
addition, forbearance may have cost nondominant carriers the opportunity to obtain
artificially high prices for their services as a result of tacit price collusion with dominant
firms. See Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, and infra notes 285-286
and accompanying text
268. 47 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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right to oppose all changes in the status quo proposed by dominant carriers.
If nondominant carriers regularly interposed such objections, they would
force dominant carriers to expend substantial resources to defend their tariff
filings and could delay the availability of new rates, services, and service
terms for as much as five months.269 In the meantime, nondominant
carriers could develop, offer, and promote their own alternative services and
products. Thus, forbearance made the adoption of such a strategy by
nondominant carriers a rational business decision.
Even though these anticompetitive tactics conflicted with the rationale
and spirit underlying forbearance, the Commission had no mechanism to
deter them. The Communications Act imposed no penalty on carriers that
used the Section 204 complaint process to harass their competitors.
Furthermore, the Commission did not adopt any rules to address that
possibility.270 The Commission also could not rely on the threat of
retaliation by dominant carriers to serve as a deterrent. These firms lacked
the ability to retaliate in kind against transgressing forborne carriers because
the latter did not file tariffs. Under these circumstances, the Commission
apparently did not anticipate the abuses that forbearance invited.
2. Dominant Carriers at a Cost Disadvantage
By retaining the tariff and facilities regulation of dominant carriers, the
Commission placed these carriers at a cost disadvantage relative to forborne
carriers. Although the Commission subjected the interexchange affiliates of
exchange telephone companies to forbearance, provided that they main-
tained separate books of account and did not jointly own transmission and
switching facilities, 271 the interexchange and local exchange businesses
still generally were under common ownership.2 72 As a result, the expendi-
tures on behalf of the local exchange businesses for purposes of tariff filings
and obtaining facilities authorizations necessarily diminished the total funds
available for the interexchange businesses.273 Thus, the costs imposed by
269. Id. The Commission has discretion to suspend tariff filings "in whole or in part but
not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into
effect." Id.
270. Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 25.
271. Competitive CarrierFiflh Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 9, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1204; see also supra note 187.
272. Id. para. 9.
273. This outcome was inconsistent, however, with the concern expressed by the
Commission in the Fifth Report that imposing substantial regulatory burdens on the "smaller
exchange telephone companies" could outweigh the benefits. Id. para. 9; see also supra note
187. To prevent costs from outweighing the benefits, the Commission had decided not to
require complete structural separation of the exchange telephone companies from their
interexchange affiliates. See supra note 187.
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such regulation could give forborne carriers a financial advantage over
certain dominant carriers, such as the small independent telephone
companies, that competed in the interexchange market.2 4
C. The Impact of Forbearance on the Commission
Forbearance also reduced the Commission's administrative costs and
thereby promoted the public interest.275 For example, under forbearance,
the Commission no longer had to devote substantial resources to adjudicate
disputes over the propriety of nondominant carriers' tariff filings or to
consider these carriers' applications for facilities authorizations. In addition,
forbearance eliminated certain incidental costs:
Maintaining [the] documents [relating to tariffs and facilities authoriza-
tions] at the Commission's offices entails certain costs such as the cost
of storage space and the cost of staff time necessary to review the form
of filed tariffs, to organize the materials for public inspection, to review
special permission requests and to respond to questions from members
of the public concerning the tariffs.276
Because it determined that the disciplining effects of competitive forces on
nondominant carriers would be at least as effective as tariff and facilities
regulation,27 7 the Commission recognized that it could more appropriately
use its limited resources elsewhere.2 8 In particular, it found that "[t]he
public interest can be better served by the Commission devoting these
resources to determine the most effective regulation of carriers having
market power."279
274. A dominant carrier like AT&T, by contrast, still maintained a substantial revenue
advantage over nondominant carriers despite the discrepancy in regulatory costs created by
forbearance. Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 59,52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215
(1980); see supra note 71. Consequently, the additional regulatory costs imposed on AT&T
served only to achieve greater balance between the funds available to AT&T and
nondominant carriers in the conduct of their businesses.
275. See, e.g., Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445; Competitive Carrier
Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1199 n.24, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1210 n.24; Competitive
Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 14, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391 (1985).
276. Competitive Carrier Fourth Further Notice, 96 F.C.C.2d 922, para. 2 (1984); see
also Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1030 n.37, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1391, 1399 n.37.
277. See supra notes 23-26, 31, 205, 214 and accompanying text.
278. See Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 28; Competitive
Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 14, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391.
279. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 14, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1391. The Commission disagreed with certain carriers, including MCI and GTE Sprint,
that claimed forbearance would not significantly reduce its costs. Id. at 1025 (pointing out
that these carriers "argued that any cost savings would be offset by additional costs incurred
as a result of increased investigations of complaints, increased staff time spent responding
to individual customer inquiries and increased time required to review petitions for rulings
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With few complaints having been filed against nondominant
carriers,"' most of the regulatory oversight of their activities necessarily
related to tariff filings and facilities authorizations. By eliminating the
administrative costs associated with these procedures, the Commission
would eliminate most of the costs of regulating nondominant carriers.
Forbearance therefore allowed the Commission to streamline its operations.
D. The Impact of Forbearance on the Public
1. Advantages of Forbearance for the Public
Consistent with its mandate to regulate the American telecommunica-
tions industry in the public interest,"' the primary beneficiary of the
Commission's forbearance policies was the public. Forbearance promoted
service innovation, price competition, entry of new firms into the market,
and the rapid response by firms to market trends.2" All of these factors
contributed to the development of a telecommunications industry that was
more responsive to the public's need.
a. Service Innovation
Tariff and facilities regulation generally has inhibited innovation in
telecommunications services. The Commission has observed with regard to
tariffs:
A tariff may be restrictive because it fosters an image that all possible
service arrangements are defined within its text. Customers may be
reluctant to ask for arrangements outside of the tariff because they may
think specific arrangements are unavailable or technically not feasible
or are not willing to wait for the required lengthy tariff update
procedures to be completed.8 3
Likewise, the Commission has pointed out with regard to applications for
facilities authorizations:
If the application calls for new technology or a new service, the
proposing firm not only is required to give its competitors an early
blueprint of such technological innovations but also its exact plan for
deployment. Because such early warning does not take place in markets
not subject to price and entry controls, technological innovation by
on discriminatory practices").
280. Competitive CarrierFifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204;
see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
281. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
282. Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para.12, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 187 (1982).
283. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, para. 18, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1391.
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existing competitors or new entrants is discouraged in regulated markets
compared with unregulated ones.2
By removing these artificial constraints, forbearance from tariff and
facilities regulation fostered service innovation.
Forbearance made service innovation a necessity for nondominant
carriers to remain competitive. Without forbearance, nondominant carriers
could review the tariffs and applications for facilities authorizations filed by
others and then offer comparable services. Customers would then have few
alternatives. Although this approach would not distinguish these carriers
from their competition, it would allow them to remain competitive without
risking substantial losses. By eliminating such regulation, forbearance kept
the services offered by other carriers a secret until they went into effect. All
forborne carriers therefore had increased incentive to develop new services
and be responsive to customer needs because: (1) they alone reaped the
rewards of their ingenuity while their competitors sought to overtake them,
and (2) they had to take such action in order to retain or improve their
market share and remain competitive.
b. Price Competition
Likewise, the tariff system may have discouraged firms from engaging
in price competition by serving as a support structure for oligopolistic
pricing led by firms with market power. As with service offerings, the tariff
system enabled firms to study their competitors' filings and price their
services comparably. This process left the public with few pricing options.
The Commission explained this phenomenon:
Tariff posting ... provides an excellent mechanism for inducing
noncompetitive pricing. Since all price reductions are public, they can
be quickly matched by competitors. This reduces the incentive to
engage in price cutting. In these circumstances firms may be able to
charge prices higher than could be sustained in an unregulated market.
Thus, regulated competition all too often becomes cartel manage-
ment.u'
When firms without market power deviated from the norm, firms with
market power had the ability to punish them through predatory pricing. By
eliminating tariff filing by nondominant carriers, however, forbearance
removed the capacity of the tariff system to encourage oligopolistic pricing
284. Competitive Conier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 27 (1981); see also
Competitive Carrier Fifth Report, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, para. 10, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1204 (stating "[florbearance can stimulate competition by... decreasing the disclosure of
competitively-sensitive information to rival carriers").
285. Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, para. 26.
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and instead promoted pricing determined by competitive market forces.286
c. Market Entry by New Firms
Forbearance from tariff and facilities regulation promoted the market
entry of new firms for two reasons. First, tariff and facilities regulation
placed new firms at a competitive disadvantage to their established rivals
because it required them to disclose their business plans before they were
even able to offer their initial services. This requirement "reduc[ed] any
time-related advantages that a new firm would have over existing firms by
giving the latter more opportunity to react to the entrant."'28 Second, as
forbearance stimulated service innovation, firms were more likely to
develop and specialize in services not offered by their competitors.288
Securing their own small industry niche enabled new firms to enhance their
viability. Thus, forbearance motivated new firms to enter the industry by
removing the most substantial obstacle to their success and, in doing so,
gave the public a wider variety of service options.
d. Carrier Response to Market Trends
Forbearance from tariff and facilities regulation also advanced the
public interest by enabling firms to respond rapidly to industry develop-
ments. Because tariff and facilities regulation imposed a mandatory delay
in the availability of new services, rates, and service terms,2 9 firms could
not immediately react to new market conditions or meet the changing needs
of their customers. Forbearance eliminated that delay.
2. Disadvantages of Forbearance for the Public
Regardless of these benefits, forbearance posed several disadvantages
for the public. For example, although forborne carriers still had a statutory
obligation not to discriminate unjustly or unreasonably, monitoring their
compliance with this mandate was more difficult without published tariffs.
In addition, by allowing forborne carriers to discontinue, reduce, or
otherwise impair their service without a prior Commission finding that such
action was consistent with the public convenience and necessity, these
286. Competitive pricing enabled firms to structure their prices according to their
customers' needs and market conditions. For example, firms could offer volume discounts
to their large customers or lower prices to the general public in the attempt to improve their
business. Id. para. 24.
287. Id. para. 30.
288. Before it adopted forbearance, the Commission observed that "firms typically face
a series of rival firms offering similar service to the same location." Id.
289. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 214 (1994).
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carriers could terminate their service to areas that primarily relied on them
and leave their customers without adequate alternatives. Finally, because
dominant carriers did not enjoy the flexibility afforded by forbearance, such
firms, which could otherwise use their more substantial resources to serve
as industry leaders in service innovation, were vulnerable to losing their
technological initiative and becoming relegated to a secondary role in the
research and development of new services.' Forbearance therefore had
certain drawbacks which diminished its benefits to the public.
VI. THE JUDICIAL REJECTION OF FORBEARANCE
Despite the Commission's determination that forbearance was
necessary to achieve its regulatory objectives and consistent with the
Communications Act, the D.C. Circuit, and eventually the United States
Supreme Court, found otherwise. Initially, in MCI v. FCC (MCI Forbear-
ance),29' the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's mandatory forbear-
ance policy. More than seven years later, inAT&Tv. FCC (AT&TForbear-
ance),2 92 that same court invalidated the Commission's permissive
forbearance policy. These two decisions substantially limited the Commis-
sion's discretion to adopt the policies it considered most appropriate to
regulate competition in the telecommunications industry.
Even more significant, however, was the United States Supreme
Court's decision to involve itself in this controversy. Although the Court
denied certiorari in AT&T Forbearance,93 it agreed to resolve finally the
propriety of permissive forbearance when that issue again arose in MCI v.
AT&T (AT&T Forbearance Affirmed). 2 ' There, a divided Court held that
this policy was contrary to the Communications Act.295 In so doing, the
290. Forbearance had the potential to discourage dominant carriers from innovating.
Because traditional Title II regulation required these carriers to file their business plans with
the Commission before their effective date, forborne carriers could review these filings and,
if feasible, beat the dominant carriers to the market with their own comparable new services.
291. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although it apparently approved of
permissive forbearance because it could forbear from filing tariffs and applying for facilities
authorizations at its pleasure, MCI apparently disapproved ofmandatory forbearance because
that policy denied it certain advantages offered by the regulatory process. See, e.g.,
Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1024 n.13, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1391, 1395 n.13 (1985) (discussing administrative costs incurred to negotiate service
contracts on individual bases).
292. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
293. Id.
294. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994). For an explanation of how the issue of
permissive forbearance arose again, see infra notes 336-339 and accompanying text.
295. The Court split five to three, with Justice O'Connor taking no part in the consider-
ation or decision of the matter. Id. at 2226. The rationale of the majority opinion was
equally applicable to mandatory forbearance. See infra notes 342-62 and accompanying text.
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Court eliminated any possibility that it would ultimately validate mandatory
and permissive forbearance and thereby vindicate the regulatory scheme
adopted in Competitive Carrier.
A. The Demise of Mandatory Forbearance
One day after the Commission published the Sixth Report, MCI filed
a petition for review with the D.C. Circuit alleging that section 203(a) of
the Communications Act precludes mandatory forbearance. 296 That section
provides:
Every common carrier, except connecting carriers, shall, within such
reasonable time as the Commission shall designate, file with the
Commission and print and keep open for public inspection schedules
showing all charges for itself and its connecting carriers ... and
showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such
charges.297
According to MCI, Congress' use of "shall" in section 203(a) mandated
tariff filing and its omission of any exceptions indicated that the Commis-
sion had no discretion to abrogate that requirement.29
The D.C. Circuit adopted MCIs analysis. Like MCI, the court focused
on the terms of section 203(a), observing that "the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." 99 The court
then agreed with MCI's interpretation of that provision, noting that "[s]hall"
"is the language of command" and that "'[a]bsent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary,' courts ordinarily regard such statutory
language as conclusive." 30°
The Commission asserted that the "plain meaning" of section
203(b)(2) constituted such a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the
296. See MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1189. The court also granted MCI's motion for a stay
of the Sixth Report and ordered expedited briefing and oral argument on the petition for
review. Id. at 1188. Although MCI filed its petition for review one day after the Commission
published the Sixth Report, well within the 60-day period for such petitions, the Commission
claimed that the petition nevertheless was untimely on the grounds that MCI could not
challenge this report when it previously had not challenged either the Second Report or the
Fourth Report. Id. at 1189-90. The court, however, disagreed. Id. at 1190. It first dismissed
the Commission's reliance on the Second Report as inapposite because that report only had
applied to resellers of basic communications services. Id. It then rejected the Commission's
reliance on the Fourth Report, holding that "[o]nly when the Commission turned permission
into command did MCI's aggrievement become evident and plainly adequate to support a
challenge to the Commission's forbearance authority." Id. (footnote omitted.)
297. Id. at 1191 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982) (emphasis and deletions in original)).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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contrary."30 That section states:
The Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown,
modify any requirement made by or under the authority of this section
either in particular instances or by general order applicable to special
circumstances or conditions except that the Commission may not
require the notice period., to be more than ninety days.
302
The Commission therefore contended, as it had in the Sixth Report, that its
adoption of mandatory forbearance was a permissible "modification" of
section 203's tariff filing requirements in response to "particular instances"
or "special circumstances or conditions"--the development of competition
in the telecommunications industry.0 3
The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this contention for three reasons.
First, the court pointed out that the word "modify' suggests "circumscribed
alterations" and not, as the Commission asserted, "wholesale abandonment
or elimination of a requirement."3 " Second, the court cited Second Circuit
precedents that purportedly limited the Commission's discretion under
section 203.305 Third, and most importantly, the court cited the Commis-
sion's statements from previous cases that all common carriers had to file
tariffs in order to offer telecommunications services to the public regardless
of whether market conditions no longer justified such regulation.3°
The court also rejected the Commission's alternative argument that it
has general authority to impose mandatory forbearance pursuant to its broad
statutory power to regulate the telecommunications industry in the public
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982) (emphasis and deletions in original)).
303. Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391
(1985); see supra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
304. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
305. Id. The court quoted AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1978), which stated
that "[t]he Communications Act requires ... that carriers file their tariffs with the FCC
.." andAT&Tv. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 879 (2d Cir. 1973), which stated that "under Section
203(b) the Commission may only modify requirements as to the form of, and information
contained in, tariffs and the thirty days notice provision." MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1192
(emphasis and ellipses in original).
306. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1192-93. The court quoted the Commission's comments
in Western Union Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 75 F.C.C.2d 461, para. 47
(1980), that "[t]here can be no question that tariffs are essential to the entire administrative
scheme of the Act" and that "[t]he importance of tariffs and the requirement that common
carriers-all common carriers--must offer all of their communications services to the public
through published tariffs is well established." MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1192-93 (emphasis
removed). The court also quoted the Commission's brief in AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d at 49-
50, which stated that "[tlhe Commission has affirmative commands from Congress to ensure
... that rates and practices are set forth in tariffs filed with the FCC" and that "[t]he agency
has no authority to ignore these commands, even if market forces arguably are present which
undercut the 'natural monopoly'justification for regulation." MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1193
(emphasis removed).
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interest." 7 The Commission asserted that its mandatory forbearance policy
was analogous to previous orders by other agencies detariffing certain
airline, railroad, and trucking services which the D.C. Circuit had up-
held.30 8 The court disagreed, concluding that these precedents were
inapposite because "Congress had supplied explicit deregulatory authori-
ty."M The court further noted that, in the Record Carrier Competition Act
of 1981, Congress had expressly granted the Commission forbearance
authority when it provided that "[i]n order to meet the purposes of this
section, the Commission shall forbear from exercising its authority under
[Title II of the Communications Act] as the development of competition
among record carriers reduces the degree of regulation necessary to protect
the public." 310 Under these circumstances, the court suggested that
Congress would have specified the Commission's authority to forbear from
tariff regulation if it intended to confer such authority.31
In sum, it was irrelevant to the D.C. Circuit whether mandatory
forbearance was a reasonable regulatory response to the development of
competition. According to the court, the Commission simply had no
authority to adopt such a policy.3 2 Thus, if the Commission insisted on
pursuing mandatory forbearance to achieve its regulatory objectives, its only
option was to obtain the necessary authority from Congress.313
307. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1193.
308. Id. at 1194. The Commission relied on Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v.
United States, 757 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (motor carriers); Brae Corp. v. United States,
740 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rail carriers); and National Small Shipments Traffic
Conference, Inc. v. CivilAeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (air carriers). MCI
v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1194-1195; see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 674 F.2d 160 (2d
Cir. 1982) (affirming Commission order permitting international record carriers to detariff
their terminal equipment offerings).
309. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1194. The D.C. Circuit asserted that the applicable statutes
in those cases were distinguishable from section 203 of the Communications Act because,
rather than authorizing modifications, they permitted the governing agencies to exempt
carriers from the tariff filing requirements. Id. at 1194-95; see also Central & S. Motor
Freight Tariff Ass'n, 757 F.2d at 306 (relevant statute states that the Interstate Commerce
Commission "may grant relief from" its terms to motor contract carriers "when relief is
consistent with the public interest and the transportation policy of section 10101 of [Title
49]"); Brae Corp., 740 F.2d at 1034-35 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 10505(a) which authorizes
Interstate Commerce Commission to "exempt" rail carriers from certain regulations);
National Small Shipments Conf, 618 F.2d at 827 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 1388(c) which allows
the Civil Aeronautics Board to "exempt" all air cargo carriers from "any" statutory
provisions that it deems appropriate).
310. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1195 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 222(b)(1) (emphasis supplied
by court)). For a discussion of the Record Carrier Competition Act of 1981, see supra note
153.
311. Id. at 1195.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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B. The Demise of Permissive Forbearance
1. The D.C. Circuit's Decision
In contrast to MCI's direct challenge to mandatory forbearance through
its petition for review of the Sixth Report,"4 AT&T indirectly challenged
permissive forbearance through a complaint filed with the Commission
seeking damages and a cease and desist order against MCI.31 5 AT&T
asserted that it was sustaining injury as a result of MCI's continuing
violations of section 203(a), which consisted of charging certain customers
unfiled "special negotiated rates." 1 6 This MCI practice allegedly placed
AT&T at a competitive disadvantage because Competitive Carrier still
required AT&T to file all of its rates with the Commission, thereby
impeding AT&T's ability to match MCI's rates promptly and subjecting
AT&T to costly and time consuming defenses of its tariffs in response to
challenges raised by competitors like MCI.317 MCI conceded that it had
not filed all of its rates, but asserted that as a nondominant carrier it was
properly acting pursuant to the Fourth Report, which it claimed was a
substantive rule that terminated the mandatory application of section 203(a)
to nondominant carriers 18 After substantial delay,319 the Commission
adopted MCI's position, dismissed AT&T's complaint without assessing
whether MCI's actions violated the Communications Act, and stated that it
would only consider the validity of the Fourth Report in future rulemak-
ings.320 The Commission concurrently commenced such a rulemaking,
Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers (Tariff Filing
314. See id. and supra note 296 and accompanying text.
315. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also In re AT&T v. MCI,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red. 807, para. 13, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 404
(1992). AT&T brought this action pursuant to section 208, which required the Commission
to investigate the matter and issue an order within 12 to 15 months. AT&T v. FCC, 978
F.2d at 730 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 208(a)-(b)); AT&T v. MCI, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 807, para. 13, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 404.
316. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d at 730. This lawsuit addressed the Commission's permissive
forbearance policy regarding tariff filings under section 203 and did not consider the validity
of the Commission's decision to forbear from enforcing the facilities authorization require-
ments of section 214.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. The Commission took more than twice the statutory time to act. Id. at 731.
320. Id.; see also In re AT&T v. MCI, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red.
807, para. 13, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 404. For the first time, the Commission stated that
the Fourth Report was a substantive rule. See AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d at 731.
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Rulemaking).32'
On review, the D.C. Circuit reprimanded the Commission for the
manner in which it had disposed of this matter. Describing the Commis-
sion's actions as an "administrative law shell game" 3' and "troubling
tactics," 31 the court pointed out:
It is rather apparent that, because the Commission fears the Fourth
Report cannot withstand judicial scrutiny (at least in our court), it wants
to avoid judicial review of the rule [in order to] allow the Fourth
Report to continue to govern the conduct of carriers for as long as
possible.324
The court noted that agencies like the Commission "cannot avoid their
responsibilities in an adjudication properly before them by looking to a
rulemaking, which operates only prospectively,""32 and held that "the
Commission had an obligation to answer the questions raised [by AT&T's
complaint] and to decide whether MCI had violated the statute." '326 The
Commission's failure to do so therefore was arbitrary and capricious and
constituted a further delaying tactic to avoid formally examining the validity
of its permissive forbearance policy.
327
Rejecting as spurious the Commission's claim that judicial review of
the Fourth Report was premature,32 the D.C. Circuit then invalidated that
report on the same basis that it had vacated the Sixth Report.329 In
addressing arguments identical to those made by the Commission in support
of its mandatory forbearance policy, the court quoted extensively from, and
321. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, Notice ofProposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 804 (1992).
322. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d at 732.
323. Id. at 734.
324. Id. at 731. The Commission apparently believed that its dismissal of AT&T's
complaint without expressly relying on or affirming the validity of the Fourth Report would
avoid judicial review of permissive forbearance. Id. at 733.
325. Id. at 732. The court detailed the differences between the Commission's quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial roles and concluded that "[t]o the extent that the Commission
thought it had discretion to postpone decision to a rulemaking, it misunderstood its role as
an adjudicator." Id. at 733.
326. Id. at 732.
327. Id. at 733.
328. The Commission argued that, because it had not assessed the Fourth Reports
validity or decided the merits of AT&T's claim against MCI, the court should remand the
matter. Id. The court disagreed, citing its earlier opinion invalidating the Sixth Report, the
Commission's previous delays, and judicial authority to review agency rules after they have
been applied in adjudicatory proceedings. Id. at 734 (stating that by its dismissal, the
Commission "necessarily" had denied the relief sought and sanctioned MCI's conduct
pursuant to the Fourth Report).
329. Id. at 735-37.
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reaffirmed its reasoning in, MCI Forbearance.33 It again "concluded that
the language of the statute was not susceptible to the Commission's
reading"33 and, as with mandatory forbearance, held that the Commission
had no statutory authority to "modify" section 203 to allow for permissive
forbearance from tariff filing 32
Although the court stated that it "understood" the Commission's desire
for regulatory flexibility and did not "quarrel with the Commission's policy
objectives," it reiterated that Congress had neither granted such flexibility
nor authorized permissive forbearance.333 Under these circumstances, the
court vacated the Fourth Repor 34 and remanded the case for adjudication
of AT&T's complaint on the merits.33
2. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
Less than two weeks after the D.C. Circuit decided AT&T Forbear-
ance, the Commission reaffirmed its permissive forbearance policy in a
Report and Order promulgated during the Tariff Filing Rulemaking (Tariff
Filing Report).335 In so doing, the Commission failed to acknowledge the
decision against it in AT&T Forbearance and reiterated its determination
that permissive forbearance advanced the purposes of the Communications
Act by eliminating impediments to competition.337 It also directly attribut-
ed the growth of competition in the interexchange market to its permissive
330. Id. at 735-36; see also supra notes 299-313 and accompanying text.
331. Id. at 735.
332. Id. at 736 (finding that statute "is not open to the Commission's construction").
333. Id.
334. Id. at 737.
335. Id. The Commission considered AT&T's complaint on the merits in In re AT&T v
MCI, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Red. 3202, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1169
(1993), and ordered MCI "to file tariffs including the information required by section 203
for all of its interstate common carrier services." Id. para. 4.
336. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, Report and Order,
7 FCC Rcd. 8072, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 898 (1992) [hereinafter Tariff Filing Report].
The Commission adopted this Report and Order pursuant to its claimed "modification"
authority on November 5, 1992, eight days before the D.C. Circuit decided AT&T
Forbearance, and released it on November 25, 1992. Id. para. 17.
337. Id. para. 36. The Commission again relied on its findings in Competitive Carrier that
"mandatory tariff regulation of nondominant carriers was in fact at odds with the fundamen-
tal statutory purpose set forth in Section 1 of the [Communications] Act because it inhibits
price competition, service innovation, entry into the market, and the ability of firms to
respond quickly to market trends." Id. (footnote omitted). The Commission also noted that
mandatory tariff filing was unnecessary to protect the public because (I) customers could
change carriers when their own charged seemingly unjust or unreasonable rates, (2) the
section 208 complaint process remained available to address allegations relating to the
charging ofunjust or unreasonable rates, and (3) the Commission retained power to reimpose
tariff filing requirements when necessary. Id. paras. 36-37.
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forbearance policy.33 Based on this "successful practical experience with
permissive detariffing," the Commission concluded that "it would be
unreasonable to disturb [that policy] in the absence of Congressional or
judicial commands."'339 Although the D.C. Circuit seemed to have issued
such a "command" when it vacated the Fourth Report in AT&T Forbear-
ance,340 the United States Supreme Court made clear that the Communica-
tions Act did not authorize permissive forbearance when it invalidated the
Tariff Filing Report in AT&T Forbearance Affirmed.34'
The majority and dissenting opinions in AT&TForbearance Affirmed
reveal, however, diametrically opposite views of statutory construction. The
majority opinion so strictly construed the Communications Act that a
forbearance policy in any form could not prevail. By contrast, the dissenting
opinion so liberally construed the Communications Act that a forbearance
policy in any form could not fail. Thus, the composition of the Supreme
Court was crucial and made the result predictable.
a. The Majority Opinion
Like the D.C. Circuit, a majority of the Supreme Court ("Majority")
first found that this dispute "turns on the meaning of the phrase 'modify
any requirement' in § 203(b)(2) ' ,342 and then narrowly construed it.343
The Majority explained:
The word 'modify'-like a number of other English words employing
the root 'mod-' (deriving from the Latin word for 'measure'), such as
'moderate,' 'modulate,' 'modest,' and 'modicum,'-has a connotation
of increment or limitation. Virtually every dictionary we are aware of
338. Id. para. 39. The Commission pointed out that while "approximately a dozen long
distance carriers operated within the United States" in 1982, "there were an estimated 482
such carriers purchasing switched access from local exchange carriers" by 1992. Id. In
addition, AT&T's growth rate was significantly less than that of nondominant carriers;
AT&T's share of minutes of the interstate market and rates for directly dialed interstate calls
declined substantially; and nondominant carriers had engaged in intensive capital investment
programs which led them to own more than half of the long-distance industry's fiber optic
route miles. Id. para. 40.
339. Id. para. 40.
340. See supra notes 322-35 and accompanying text.
341. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (Scalia, J.) (1994). The Supreme Court granted the
petitions of MCI and the United States for certiorari after the D.C. Circuit summarily
reversed the TariffFiling Report upon AT&T's motion. Id. at 2228. There, in an unpublished
per curlan order, the D.C. Circuit held that "[t]he decision of this court in [AT&T
Forbearance] conclusively determined that the FCCs authorization of permissive detariffing
violates Section 203(a) of the Communications Act." Id.
342. Id. at 2229.
343. Id. at 2229-30.
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says that 'to modify' means to change moderately or in minor
fashion.344
In making this finding, the Majority rejected the notion that the Commis-
sion's adoption of a more expansive definition of "modify" deserved
deference because certain dictionary definitions broadly state that "modify"
means "to make a basic or important change in. 345 The Majority reasoned
that the availability of several dictionary definitions does not create
"sufficient ambiguity" requiring courts to defer to an administrative agency's
choice as to which one to follow.3 46 The Majority also noted that when
the Communications Act became law in 1934, "the most relevant time for
determining a statutory term's meaning,"' 4  "all English dictionaries
provided the narrow definition of 'modify.'
3 48
344. Id. at 2229 (citing RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236
(2d ed. 1987) ("to change somewhat the form or qualities of; alter partially; amend");
WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1976) ("to make minor changes
in the form or structure of- alter without transforming!); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
952 (2d ed. 1989) ("[tjo make partial changes in; to change (an object) in respect of some
of its qualities; to alter or vary without radical transformation"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1004 (6th ed. 1990) ("[t]o alter;, to change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge;
extend; amend; limit; reduce")).
345. Id., 114 S.Ct at 2229 (quoting WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1452 (1976)). The Majority noted that petitioners also cited WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 763 (1991), "which includes among its definitions of 'modify,'
'to make basic or fundamental changes in often to give a new orientation to or serve a new
end,"' and could have cited WEBSTER'S EIGHTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973)
and WEBSTER'S SEvENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963), which contain
comparable definitions. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2229 n.2. By contrast, the Majority
pointed out that "[t]he last New Collegiate to be based upon Webster's Second New
International, rather than Webster's Third, does not include 'basic or fundamental change'
among the accepted meanings of 'modify."' Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1949)).
346. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2229 (observing that the dictionary definitions relied
on by petitioners derived exclusively from WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIO-
NARY 1452 (1976)); cf., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 "(1984) (discussing the principle of judicial deference). Petitioners
unsuccessfully contended that National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine
Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992), required such deference. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2229-30.
Disagreeing with petitioners, the Majority explained that Boston and Maine involved "a
selection between accepted alternative meanings shown as such by many dictionaries" as
well as "contextual indications" favorable to a finding of deference. Id. at 2230. Here, by
contrast, the Majority found that: (1) contextual indications contradict the petitioners'
position and (2) the broad definitions of "modify" derive from a single source, Webster,
and are coupled with the narrow definitions. Id. at 2229. The Majority expressed confusion
as to how "modify' can "connote both (specifically) major change and (specifically) minor
change." Id. at 2230 (emphasis in original).
347. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2230.
348. Id. (emphasis in original). The Majority further pointed out that all "Webster's"
dictionaries published then provided only the narrow meaning. Id.
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The limitation on the Commission's authority to extend the notice
period for changes to filed tariffs established by section 203(b)(2) was
equally significant to the Majority.349 Section 203(b)(2) provides that the
Commission cannot require this notice period to exceed 120 days.3 50 The
Majority asked whether it is "conceivable that the statute is indifferent to
the Commission's power to eliminate the tariff-filing requirement entirely
for all except one firm in the long-distance sector, and yet strains out the
gnat of extending the waiting period for tariff revision beyond 120
days?"35' To the Majority, the obvious answer was "no. 352
Under these circumstances, the Majority concluded that permissive
forbearance could survive judicial scrutiny only if it did not radically or
fundamentally change the Communication Act's tariff filing require-
ments.33 Finding that mandatory rate filing was the "heart" of the
statutory scheme and "the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated
industry,"3 ' the Majority doubted that Congress had intended for the
Commission to implement a regulatory policy like permissive forbearance:
It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of
whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-
regulated to agency discretion--and even more unlikely that it would
achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to "modify"
rate-filing requirements.35
Even if Congress had granted the Commission some regulatory flexibility
in this regard, the Majority could not conceive of permissive forbearance,
which eliminated the tariff-filing requirements for carriers serving 40
percent of interexchange consumers and all but one interexchange carrier,
as being merely a "modification."356 Rather, the Majority found that
permissive forbearance was an impermissible "fundamental revision of the
statute, changing it from a scheme of rate regulation in long-distance
common-carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation only where
effective competition does not exist." '357
According to the Majority, permissive forbearance failed for three
349. Id. at 2230-31.
350. Id. at 2230.
351. Id. at 2230-31.
352. Id. at 2231.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 2231-32.
355. Id. at 2232.
356. Id. The Majority questioned the Commission's argument that the inquiry should
focus on the percentage of consumers affected by permissive forbearance (40% of the
market) rather than the proportion of carriers affected (all except AT&T). Id. Under both
alternatives, however, permissive forbearance failed to survive the Majority's analysis. Id.
357. Id.
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additional reasons. First, the Majority pointed out that when the Commis-
sion seeks to make a modification under section 203(b)(2) "by general
order," as it attempted here, the order must apply "to special circumstances
or conditions" and relatedly observed that "[i]t is hard to imagine that a
condition shared by 40% of all long-distance customers, and by all long-
distance carriers except one, qualifies as 'special' within the intent of this
limitation.""35 Second, the Majority found no evidence that Congress had,
in effect, ratified the Commission's permissive forbearance policy through
subsequent legislation.359 Third, the Majority rejected the argument that
permissive forbearance was an appropriate exercise of the Commission's
broad mandate to promote efficient service by eliminating a competitive
barrier.36 In sum, like the D.C. Circuit, the Majority believed that
Congress, not the courts, was the appropriate forum in which to debate the
propriety of forbearance.3
61
The Majority nevertheless did not preclude the Commission from
exercising its section 203(b)(2) "modification" powers in the future.
Although the Majority struck down permissive forbearance, it acknowledged
that Congress had authorized the Commission to change the tariff-filing
requirement on a more limited basis.362 The Majority failed, however, to
specify the extent of this limited "modification" authority.
b. The Dissenting Opinion
Liberally construing the Commission's powers under the Communi-
cations Act, three Justices ("Dissent") vigorously disagreed with the
Majority.3 63 The Dissent recognized that, because the "communications
industry has an unusually dynamic character,"3' Congress granted the
Commission "unusually broad discretion" to regulate it in the public
interest.3 6 The Dissent also noted that, consistent with this grant, the
Supreme Court previously had facilitated the Commission's exercise of
358. Id (footnote omitted).
359. Id. at 2232-33. The Majority acknowledged that both sides of the permissive
forbearance issue could cite at least one example of recent legislation which suggested that
Congress supported their position, but explained that this conflict "indicate[d] [only] that
Congress was aware of the decade-long tug of war between the Commission and the D.C.
Circuit over the authority to relax filing requirements, and at different times proceeded on
different assumptions as to who would win." Id. at 2233.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 2234.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
discretion in fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities 3 6 For this reason, the
Dissent sharply criticized the Majority for now "abandon[ing] that approach
in favor of a rigid literalism that deprives the FCC of the flexibility
Congress meant it to have in order to implement the core policies of the
[Communications] Act in rapidly changing conditions."'367
Contrary to the Majority, the Dissent contended that "the heart of...
the... Communications Act" was the Commission's "substantive duty of
[guaranteeing] reasonably priced and nondiscriminatory service," not "the
mere process of filing rate schedules.""36 The Dissent found support for
this viewpoint in section 203(c), which requires carriers to file tariffs before
offering services "unless otherwise provided by or under authority of [the
Communications] Act,"'3 69 coupled with section 203(b)(2), which "is
plainly one provision that 'otherwise provides' and thereby authorizes
service without a filed schedule." 370 Moreover, the Dissent pointed out
that the sole statutory restriction on the Commission's modification authority
was that it could not extend the 120-day notice period established by
section 203(b)(1). 371' Thus, according to the Dissent, "[ilt was no stretch
for the FCC to draw from this single, unidirectional statutory limitation on
its modification authority the inference that its authority is otherwise
unlimited. 372
The Dissent further argued that the Majority's substantial reliance on,
and use of, certain narrow dictionary definitions of "modify" was disingenu-
ous because it ignored "another, long-established meaning that fully
supports the Commission's position."373 Observing that dictionaries "are
no substitute for close analysis of what words mean as used in a particular
statutory context, 374 the Dissent explained that the Commission's permis-
sive forbearance policy should nevertheless survive even under the narrow
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 2235.
369. Id. at 2236 (emphasis removed).
370. Id. The Dissent construed the statutory language authorizing the Commission to
"modify" the tariff-filing requirements in "particular instances" or by "general order
applicable to special circumstances or conditions" as conferring broad discretion on the
Commission to adjust those requirements either narrowly or expansively according to
existing conditions. Id. The Dissent considered the development of competition in the
telecommunications industry a "special circumstance or condition" warranting the Commis-
sion to exercise its modification authority. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 2237. In support of this proposition, the Dissent quoted WEBSTER'S COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934), which defines "modify" as "to limit or reduce in
extent or degree." MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2237 (footnote omitted).
374. Id. at 2237.
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definitions of "modify."3" Consistent with these definitions, the Dissent
viewed the Commission's staged implementation of permissive forbearance
as a "measured" regulatory approach designed to advance the statutory goal
of constraining monopoly power and thereby remain "faithful" to the
primary purpose of section 203's tariff-filing requirements.376 The Dissent
cited the development of meaningful competition in the interexchange
market since Competitive Carrier commenced as compelling evidence that
the Commission, rather than the Majority, best understood the legislative
intent underlying section 203.3
In concluding, the Dissent effectively summarized its disagreement
with the Majority's decision and supporting rationale:
The flied tariff provisions of the Communications Act are not ends in
themselves, but are merely one of several procedural means for the
Commission to ensure that carriers do not charge unreasonable or
discriminatory rates .... Even if the 1934 Congress did not define the
scope of the Commission's modification authority with perfect scholarly
precision, this is surely a paradigm case for judicial deference to the
agency's interpretation, particularly in a statutory regime so obviously
meant to maximize administrative flexibility. Whatever the best reading
of § 203(b)(2), the Commission's reading cannot ... be termed
unreasonable. It is informed (as ours is not) by a practical understand-
ing of the role (or lack thereof) that filed tariffs play in the modem
regulatory climate and in the telecommunications industry"7
This rebuke of the Majority made clear that the Dissent had a different
vision of the judiciary's role in construing the statutorily-defined powers of
regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, while the Dissent would have sustained
the Commission's "eminently sound, experience-tested, and uncommonly
375. Id. at 2236-37.
376. Id. The Dissent noted that "[w]hether the current policy should count as a
cataclysmic or merely an incremental departure from the Section 203(a) baseline depends
on whether one focuses on particular carriers' obligations to file (in which case the commis-
sion's policy arguably works a major shift) or on the statutory policies behind the tariff-filing
requirement (which remain satisfied because market constraints on nondominant carriers
obviate the need for rate-filing)." Id. (footnote omitted). The Dissent focused on the latter.
Id. at 2237 (citing BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1198 (3d ed. 1933), which defined "modifi-
cation" as "[a] change; an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or
cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter
intact") (emphasis in original)).
377. Id. at 2237-38. The Dissent contended that the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimina-
tion Act of 1936, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13, constitutes additional evidence that the
Majority's statutory analysis was wrong because it "contains a much broader prohibition
against price discrimination than does the Communications Act [and] has performed its
mission for almost sixty years without any counterpart to the filed rate doctrine." Id. at 2238.
378. Id. (emphasis in original).
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well explained judgment,"379 the Majority's rejection of permissive
forbearance prevailed.
C. Evaluation of the Forbearance Decisions
The judicial repudiation ofpermissive and mandatory forbearance from
tariff filing limited substantially the Commission's discretion to adopt
policies which it considered most appropriate to regulate competition.
Although the Commission cannot pursue policies that are contrary to law,
the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit undertook a strict construction of
section 203 to find that permissive and mandatory forbearance exceeded the
Commission's statutory mandate. That interpretive approach, therefore, calls
into question the legitimacy of the courts' assertions that they based their
decisions on the statutory language in dispute and not on their own
misgivings about the merits of the Commission's forbearance policies.38
More importantly, however, the practical effect of the courts' actions was
that, by denying the Commission maximum flexibility under the statutory
language to adapt its policies to an ever-changing industry,3"' the
Commission could have lost its ability to enact innovative regulatory
policies that addressed previously unforeseen developments in telecommu-
nications.
The downfall of the Commission's forbearance policies came as a
result of the adoption, by both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit, of
a narrow definition of "modify" as used in section 203(b).3 2 In holding
that "modify" "suggest[s] circumscribed alterations" 83 and "means to
change moderately or in minor fashion, '" 384 the courts were in accord with
certain authorities that define "modify" as "to change in incidental or
subordinate features"385 and "[t]o make minor changes in the form or
379. Id. at 2239.
380. In AT&T Forbearance Affirmed, the Majority suggested that permissive forbearance
was the wrong approach to the regulation of competition in the interexchange market by
expressing "doubt [that] it makes sense, if one is concerned about the use of filed tariffs to
communicate pricing information, to require filing by the dominant carrier, the firm most
likely to be a price leader." Id. at 2233.
381. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1942) (noting that "Congress was
acting in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic" when it passed the
Communications Act).
382. See supra notes 299-313 and 342-57 and accompanying text.
383. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
384. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2223.
385. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 Md. App.
702, 718, 581 A.2d 846, 854 (1990), affd, 324 Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1377 (1991); BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIoNARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990).
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structure .... " 38 6 However, the courts also conflicted with other authori-
ties that broadly define "modify" as "[to change in form or character,"317
"[tio alter,"388 "[to make less extreme, severe, or strong,"389 "[tio make
more temperate,"31' "to increase or decrease,"39' to "amend,"392 to "lim-
it,"393 and to "reduce."'394 Permissive and mandatory forbearance were
consistent with the Commission's statutory power to "modify any require-
ment made by or under the authority of [section 203]" 39' as broadly
defined, because they constitute the utmost forms of altering, amending,
limiting, and reducing the tariff-filing requirements. 96 Under any of the
narrower definitions, by contrast, these policies could not survive. The
courts' selection of the governing definition therefore was outcome
determinative.
3 97
386. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1986).
387. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1161 (3d ed. 1992).
388. Id.; AT&T v. FCC, 503 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1974). In AT&T Forbearance
Affirmed, MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2223, the Majority suggested that "to alter" supports
its narrow construction of "modify". As the authorities relied on by the Majority indicate,
however, "to alter" supports a broad construction of "modify" when qualifying or limiting
adjectives are absent. For example, the Majority cites the RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987), WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1452 (1976), and 9 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989), which
respectively include to "alter partially," "alter without transforming," and "alter or vary
without radical transformation" among their definitions of"modify." See MCI v. AT&T, 114
S. Ct. at 2229. If"to alter" alone had the narrow meaning suggested by the Majority, the use
of such qualifying or limiting adjectives with "alter" would have lacked purpose.
389. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1161 (3d ed. 1992).
390. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1976).
391. Freese v. County of Douglas, 315 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1982).
392. Lee Enter., Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Iowa 1968);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990).
393. Anderson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 176 Cal. Rptr. 66, 67 (1981); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1990).
394. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1990). As with "to alter," the Majority in
AT&TForbearance Affirmed suggested that, as definitions, "amend," "limit," and "reduce"
support its narrow construction of "modify." MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2229. That
conclusion is suspect for the same reasons discussed supra at note 388.
395. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added); see also Competitive Carrier
Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, paras. 87-88.
396. Some dictionaries do not even include the narrow definitions, while others only
include them on a secondary basis. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1161 (3d
ed. 1992); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1986). But see 58 C.J.S. Modify § 840 (1948) (stating
that "tjhe power to modify anything does not imply a power to substitute a thing entirely
different, and it does not confer the power to destroy") (footnotes omitted).
397. The Communications Act's legislative history offers no guidance on this issue.
Congress based the Communications Act on the Interstate Commerce Act passed nearly 50
years earlier and substantially relied on the legislative history of that earlier legislation. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 73-781 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1850 (1934); see also ABC v. FCC, 643
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Although permissive and mandatory forbearance by definition were not
"modifications" according to the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit, the extent
of the Commission's authority to implement other novel regulatory strategies
without violating section 203 remained uncertain. The courts provided no
guidelines to assist the Commission in evaluating whether proposals to
change section 203's tariff-filing requirements pursuant to the power to
"modify' constituted permissible "circumscribed alterations" or changes in
"minor fashion." For example, while the D.C. Circuit "note[d]" that "the
Commission could further streamline the regulation of nondominant carriers
without encountering any contrary congressional prescription!""' and the
Supreme Court explained that the tariff-filing requirement was not "so
inviolate that the Commission's existing modification authority does not
reach it at all,"3  both courts failed to define the parameters of such
possible Commission action. That omission only invited further controversy
and impaired the Commission's confidence in its ability to develop
comprehensive regulatory policies that could withstand judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit's suggestion that the Commission could
further streamline its regulation of nondominant carriers without violating
section 203(b) contradicted the narrow definition of "modify" it adopted to
invalidate permissive and mandatory forbearance. According to the court,
the streamlined regulation previously adopted by the Commission, which
permitted nondominant carriers to file tariffs on fourteen-day instead of
ninety-day notice, was a proper statutory "modification. ',4 ° That "modifi-
cation" constituted, however, an 85 percent reduction in the notice period,
hardly a "circumscribed alteration." Rather, such a reduction was a
"modification" only under a broad definition. The court's support for
additional reductions in the notice period therefore compounded the
inconsistency of its position. In essence, the court was advising the
Commission that it would affirm the elimination of the notice period as an
acceptable "modification" provided that nondominant carriers continued to
file tariffs.4"' This selective invocation of the broad definition of "modify"
F.2d 818, 820-821 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that "[t]o understand the purposes of the
Communications Act, [a court] must look to the legislative history of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, for the Communications Act borrowed its language and purpose
from the Interstate Commerce Act").
398. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
399. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2233.
400. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d at 1196.
401. Such a result would be consistent with the Second Circuit's statement that the
Commission may waive the notice requirements of section 203(b). See AT&T v. FCC, 487
F.2d 865, 871 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973); see also ABC v. FCC, 682 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that the Commission may forego pre-effectiveness review of a tariff). However, in
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in support of streamlined regulation and the narrow definition of the word
in opposition to permissive and mandatory forbearance demonstrates the
tenuous rationale underlying the court's forbearance holdings.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that "[c]ertainly the Commission can
modify the form, contents, and location of required filings, and can defer
filing or even waive it altogether in limited circumstances"4 ' was
similarly flawed. After adopting a narrow definition of "modify," the
Majority provided no explanation as to how the Commission's occasional
elimination of the tariff-filing requirement could constitute an acceptable
exercise of its modification authority.4 3 In fact, the elimination of the
tariff-filing requirement under any circumstances would conflict with the
rationale of the Majority's opinion. The Majority's failure to specify the
scope of the Commission's modification authority after a decade of litigation
therefore fostered uncertainty by again leaving the Commission to define
the breadth of its powers.
The adoption of a narrow definition of "modify" to invalidate
permissive and mandatory forbearance also was inconsistent with the
judicial interpretation of that word as used in another provision of the
Communications Act.4 In Transcontinent Television Corp. v. FCC,405
the D.C. Circuit considered whether the Commission's deletion of a VHF
television station after a broadcaster's license was to expire constituted a
"modification" of a station license requiring a public evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 316(a) of the Communications Act.4 6 Noting that a
both MCI Forbearance and AT&T Forbearance, the D.C. Circuit ignored the Second
Circuit's opinion in AT&T v. FCC, 503 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1974), the one case in which a
court addressed the meaning of "modify" as used in section 203(b). There, the Second
Circuit evaluated the validity of a Commission rule extending the existing 30-day notice
period for tariff filings to 60 days under the power to "modify" the tariff filing requirements
conferred by section 203(b). AT&T v. FCC, 503 F.2d at 612. AT&T argued, to no avail, that
this power authorized only a reduction in the notice period. AT&T v. FCC, 503 F.2d at 615.
Noting that the "language of the statute is not ambiguous," the court expansively held that
"the word 'modify' used in the statute plainly gives the FCC the power to alter or change
the notice period whether it results in an increase or decrease of time involved." AT&T v.
FCC, 503 F.2d at 614. Although the Second Circuit did not consider whether "modify"
included authority to adopt a forbearance policy, it suggested that the Commission had broad
discretion either to decrease or increase substantially the notice period. AT&T v. FCC, 503
F.2d at 614-15.
402. MCI v. AT&T, 114 S.Ct. at 2233.
403. See id. at 2232-33; see supra note 362 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., Transcontinent TV Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339, 341-344 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(considering the meaning of the phrase "modified by Commission" as used in section 316(a)
of the Communications Act).
405. Id. at 339.
406. Id. at 340-41. Section 316(a) of the Communications Act stated in pertinent part:
"'Any station license * * * may be modified by the Commission either for a limited time
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station license does not vest a property right in the holder or confer a right
to use the frequencies referenced therein beyond its term, the court held that
the Commission's action was not a "modification" within the statutory
language." 7 The court instead "construe[d] section 316(a) as having
reference to a modification which interferes with rights of a licensee during
the term of its license."4 8 The deletion of the station under those circum-
stances would constitute a "modification."4" Because deletion of a station
is the "wholesale abandonment or elimination" of a station and not a
"circumscribed alteration" of license terms, the definition of "modify"
adopted by the court in this case was the opposite of the definition it
adopted in its forbearance decisions.
In rejecting the Commission's forbearance policies, the Supreme Court
and D.C. Circuit also disregarded well-settled principles governing judicial
review of statutory interpretations by administrative agencies. Ordinarily,
courts show "great deference" to the interpretations of statutes by the
agencies charged with their administration.41 The Commission is such an
agency and therefore typically receives judicial deference in its interpreta-
tions of the Communications Act, which it administers by Congressional
mandate.4 ' The D.C. Circuit explained this deference:
'To sustain the Commission's application of [a] statutory term, we
need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one or even
that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in
the first instance in judicial proceedings.'4 2
It further recognized the need for deference to an agency that regulates an
evolving industry like telecommunications:
Congress in passing the Communications Act in 1934 could not, of
course, anticipate the variety and nature of methods of communication
by wire or radio that would come into existence in the decades to
come. In such a situation, the expert agency entrusted with administra-
tion of a dynamic industry is entitled to latitude in coping with new
or for the duration of the term thereof * * * No such order of modification shall become
final until the holder of the license * ** shall be given reasonable opportunity * * * to
show cause by public hearing, if requested, why such order of modification should not
issue."' Id. at 341 (omissions in original; footnote omitted).
407. Id. at 342-44.
408. Id. at 343.
409. Id. at 344.
410. See Philadelphia TV Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
Supreme Court avoided having to show such deference by holding that the Commission's
interpretation of"modify" was unreasonable and therefore not entitled to deference. See MCI
v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. at 2231.
411. See Philadelphia TV Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d at 283.
412. Id. at 283-84 (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
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developments in that industry4 3
By failing to adhere to these principles in the forbearance cases, the
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit diminished the Commission's independence
as an expert agency and placed into doubt the propriety of its policies
implemented to regulate competition in the interexchange market during the
nine-year period that elapsed between the release of the Sixth Report in
1985 and the demise of permissive forbearance in 1994.
D. Continued Viability of Forbearance from Facilities Regulation
Despite the D.C. Circuit's order in AT&T Forbearance vacating the
entire Fourth Report41 4 and the lack of express statutory authority for the
Commission to forbear from enforcing the section 214 facilities authoriza-
tion requirements,415 the Commission nevertheless decided to retain its
section 214 forbearance policy 16 In explaining this decision, the Com-
mission noted that it took "various actions" in the Fourth Report, including
the adoption of the permissive detariffing policy invalidated in AT&T
Forbearance and the granting to "forborne carriers [of] blanket section 214
authority to install new facilities or remove existing facilities from
service."" The Commission concluded that the latter action was
"unaffected by the court's decision" in AT&T Forbearance41 Because
section 214 forbearance was not at issue in AT&T Forbearance, this
conclusion was reasonable.
413. Id. at 284; see also Wold Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (stating that "a reviewing court owes particular deference to the expert administrative
agency's policy judgments and predictions, its forecasts of 'the direction in which future
public interest lies,"' when "it confront[s] on review an arcane, fast-moving field of
technology" and Congress has not enunciated its own policy on the matter); supra notes 364-
79 and accompanying text, discussing the dissents concurrence with these principles in
AT&T Forbearance Affirmed. The Commission noted in the Sixth Report that "as a result
of [its own] decisions and the [MFJ] ... the telecommunications industry structure today
is drastically different from the one that existed in 1934 when the Communications Act was
enacted." Competitive Carrier Sixth Report, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1029 n.33, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1391, 1398 n.33 (1985).
414. AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 334-335 and
accompanying text.
415. Competitive Carrier Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, paras. 25-27, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 187 (1982).
416. See In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 1395, para. 6, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861 (1993) [hereinafter
Tariff Filing Notice]; see also AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
417. Tariff Filing Notice, 8 FCC Rcd. 1395, para. 6, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861.
418. Id.; see also supra notes 315-35 and accompanying text.
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E. The Communications Act as an Impediment to Competition
Regardless of whether the Communications Act truly was broad
enough to authorize the Commission's forbearance policies, the courts
nevertheless held to the contrary. This rejection made clear that the
Communications Act, as judicially interpreted, could hinder the Commission
in achieving its goal of establishing a comprehensive regulatory approach
to interexchange competition. Whether such a hindrance adversely affects
the public, however, depends on the soundness of the Commission's policies
at issue. While forbearance was an appropriate deregulatory measure to
stimulate competition, the Commission poorly executed it by failing to
justify the exclusion of AT&T from its coverage. Had the courts upheld
forbearance, the Commission's questionable retention of AT&T's dominant
classification following the MFJ eventually could have damaged AT&T and
deprived the public of the benefits of fair competition. Under such
circumstances, however, the Commission could have reclassified AT&T or
otherwise changed its regulatory approach. By contrast, once the courts
found that the Communications Act did not permit forbearance, they did not
enjoy the same flexibility to change their position. Thus, the Commission's
failure to account for market realities in Competitive Carrier ultimately did
not present as potentially severe consequences for competition as the
judicial construction of the Communications Act.
VII. REGULATORY POLICY AFTER THE FORBEARANCE DECISIONS
Confronted with the inability to exercise meaningful regulatory
flexibility under Competitive Carrier as a result of the forbearance
decisions, the Commission had no alternative except to supplement its
existing regulatory approach or devise a new one. Instead of casting aside
its long-standing regulatory approach, the Commission maintained that
Competitive Carrier still governed and adopted new policies to achieve its
goals. Unlike its earlier Competitive Carrier policies, which focused
exclusively on liberating nondominant carriers from Title HI constraints, the
Commission's new policies primarily focused on AT&T, which still endured
the burdens of extensive Title II regulation. While the Commission sought
to streamline further its regulation of nondominant carriers within the
limitations imposed by the courts, its most significant new policies included
the adoption of "price cap" regulation for AT&T419 followed by the
419. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order
and Second Further Notice, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873, 66 Rad. Reg. 372 (1989) [hereinafter AT&T
Price Cap Order].
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commencement of a new interexchange rulemaking, entitled In re
Competition in the Interexchange Marketplace (Interexchange Rulemak-
ing).420 Initiating the Interexchange Rulemaking to adopt appropriate
policies for regulating the growth of competition in long-distance business
services since Competitive Carrier,42' the Commission essentially conced-
ed that its existing Competitive Carrier policies were inadequate to govern
a telecommunications industry that included a competitive AT&T. Despite
its conclusion that the interexchange market was "not perfectly competi-
tive," the Commission determined in the Interexchange Rulemaking that
competition in the business services segment of that market had become
"sufficiently effective" to warrant AT&T's deregulation.4 It would take
five more years, however, for the Commission to conclude that AT&T was
no longer a dominant carrier.4
A4. Nondominant Carrier Regulation
Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit suggested that, as a
permissible "modification" of section 203's tariff filing requirements, the
Commission could further streamline the regulation of nondominant carriers
adopted in the First Report.42 4 Because the Commission's original
streamlined regulation policy already included a presumption that nondomi-
nant carrier tariffs were lawful on petitions to suspend, the elimination of
economic data to support nondominant carrier tariff filings, a reduction in
the notice period for tariff filings from ninety to fourteen days, and the
granting of broad certifications for the construction and use of telecommuni-
cations facilities,' the opportunity to further streamline the regulation of
nondominant carriers left the Commission with little flexibility in develop-
ing its policies to govern an evolving telecommunications industry.
Additional streamlining could at most allow for the filing of nondominant
carrier tariffs without notice, rather than the minimum fourteen-day period
420. In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Notice and Proposed
Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627 (1990); in re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1135 (1991)
[hereinafter First Interexehange Report].
421. First Interexchange Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 3, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1135.
422. Id.
423. See infra notes 469-93 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 398-399 and accompanying text. With the demise of permissive and
mandatory forbearance, the Commission's streamlined regulation policies governed
nondominant carriers. See Tariff Filing Requirements Notice, 8 FCC Rcd. 1395, 1396 n.9,
73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861, 862 n.9 (1993).
425. See supra Part III.B.
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established in the First Report, and changes in the kinds of information that
nondominant carriers had to disclose in their tariff filings.
Three months after the D.C. Circuit decided AT&T Forbearance, the
Commission proposed such further streamlined regulation in a new
rulemaking, In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common
Carriers.426 Relying on its section 203 authority to "modify" tariff filing
requirements, the Commission proposed a one-day notice period for
nondominant carrier tariffs.427 The Commission explained:
[T]he current fourteen-day notice period, although an improvement over
long notice periods, will have, in the absence of permissive detariffing,
an anticompetitive impact on nondominant carrier competition. The
advance notice period allows competitors to begin, and possibly
complete, development and implementation of a market response before
the tariff becomes effective. As such, the notice period delays the
benefits customers receive from new offerings, and discourages carriers
from taking pro-consumer actions.42
The Commission justified this shortened notice period on the grounds that
it never had suspended or investigated a nondominant carrier's tariff before
the effective date and only once had rejected such a tariff while streamlined
regulation was in effect.429 It also pointed out that adequate safeguards
existed to deter nondominant carriers from abusing a one-day-notice period,
citing both its own statutory authority to investigate nondominant carrier
tariffs after they become effective43" and the statutory right of aggrieved
parties to challenge unlawful tariff filings and seek redress for damages
caused by such filings.43'
The Commission concurrently proposed to "modify" its tariff content
rules for nondominant carriers.432 Noting that "section 203(a) of the Act
requires only that carriers file 'schedules showing all charges for itself and
its connecting carriers ... and showing the classifications, practices, and
regulations affecting such charges,' 433 the Commission suggested that its
existing tariff filing rules required nondominant carriers to disclose more
426. Tariff Filing Notice, 8 FCC Rcd. 1395, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861.
427. Id. para. 15.
428. Id. The Commission proffered no evidence to support this conclusion and seemingly
overstated the benefits that would accrue to the public by eliminating 13 days from the
notice period for tariff filings.
429. Id. para. 14.
430. Id. para. 16 (citing Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 4(i), 204-205, 403,48
Stat. 1064, 1068, 1071-72, 1094 (as amended)).
431. Id. (citing Communications Act, § 208, Stat. at 1073.)
432. Id.
433. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a); omissions in original).
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information than section 203 demanded.434 For this reason, the Commis-
sion proposed to allow nondominant carriers to set forth in their tariffs only
a maximum rate or a range of rates.435 It concluded that this rule change
would eliminate nondominant carriers' burden to file new tariffs whenever
their new rates were below the maximum rate or within the range of rates
specified in their tariffs already on file436 and "would lessen the potential
for tacit collusion among carriers by withholding from competitors the exact
rate being charged by competitors at any given time." ' Thus, this further
streamlined regulation, which the Commission formally adopted six months
later,438 would reduce nondominant carriers' costs and promote price
competition, two of the primary concerns that led to the Commission's
adoption of permissive and mandatory forbearance.439
Although this further streamlined regulation advanced some of the
same goals that the Commission sought to achieve through its failed
forbearance policies, the Commission could have anticipated that this
approach also would not survive judicial review intact. While the shortened
notice period was consistent with the forbearance decisions, 4' the rule
that nondominant carriers had to publish only their maximum rates or a
range of rates violated the general principle that a rate agreed upon for
service must "be published in" or "readily ascertainable from" a tariff on
file with the Commission''" That rule also essentially constituted an
exemption from the section 203 tariff-filing requirement in contravention of
the forbearance decisions. Because of their lack of specificity, such tariff
filings would provide the public with no useful information about the rates
nondominant carriers charged customers for particular services. The public
could not make informed challenges to nondominant carriers' tariff filings
because it could not ascertain whether these carriers were engaging in unjust
or unreasonable price discrimination. It therefore is not surprising that the
434. Id.
435. Id. The Commission contended that this proposal was consistent with section 203.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common Carriers, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 6752, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 849 (1993) [hereinafter
Nondominant Filing Order].
439. See supra notes 264-66, 285-86 and accompanying text
440. See supra notes 398-99 and accompanying text.
441. See AT&T v. MCI, Order, No. Civ. A. 93-1147 SSH, 1993 WL 268394, at *2
(D.D.C. July 7, 1993) (stating that "rates must be 'published in,' or 'readily ascertainable
from,' the filed schedules" (quoting Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States,
793 F.2d 376, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (invalidating Interstate Commerce Commission's tariff
rule which permitted freight forwarders to "agree to provide services to shippers at
unpublished rates determined by averaging prior charges to those shippers"))).
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D.C. Circuit eventually invalidated this range tariff filing policy as an
evasion of section 203.2
As a result of the narrow judicial construction of section 203, courts
likely would only uphold, as consistent with section 203's rate and service
disclosure requirements, a further streamlined regulatory approach that
established a shortened notice period for nondominant carrier tariff
filings443 and that limited the information which nondominant carriers had
to include in these filings. 4" The primary benefit of further streamlined
regulation would be lost, however, by requiring nondominant carriers to
continue publishing their specific rates." 5 Once nondominant carriers
revealed their exact rates to their rivals, they decreased the likelihood of
price competition and increased the risk of oligopolistic pricing."
Forbearance, by contrast, had the opposite result. 7 Thus, further stream-
lined regulation was not an effective alternative to forbearance. 4
442. See Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Relying on its
earlier forbearance decisions as well as on the majority opinion in AT&T Forbearance
Aflined, the D.C. Circuit concluded: "Congress is free to select the remedial tools it deems
appropriate; Congress decided to require common carriers to file 'schedules showing all
charges' not ranges of rates [and] [t]he FCC cannot abandon the legislative scheme because
it thinks it has a better idea." Id. at 1525. In sum, the D.C. Circuit held that "the Commis-
sion does not have the authority under section 203(b) to modify the requirements of section
203(a), allowing nondominant common carriers to file ranges of rates." Id. at 1526. While
this decision vacated the entire Nondominant Filing Order, the Commission subsequently
reinstated that order, except for its range of rates provision, on the grounds that the D.C.
Circuit did not object to its other terms. See In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondomi-
nant Common Carriers, Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 13,653, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1722 (1995).
443. See supra notes 398-400 and accompanying text.
444. The Commission's original streamlined regulation already substantially reduced the
amount of information that nondominant carriers had to submit to support their tariffs. See
supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
445. The only other benefits of this further streamlined regulation are questionable. For
example, despite the Commission's assertion to the contrary, it is unclear whether thirteen
fewer days notice ofnondominant carrier tariff filings would appreciably benefit competition.
See supra note 428 and accompanying text. Likewise, given the substantial reduction in data
required to support nondominant carrier tariff filings established by the Commission's
original streamlined regulation approach, it is unclear whether any additional reductions in
such supporting information would have a meaningful impact on competition. See supra
notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
447. Id.
448. Following the forbearance decisions, the Commission had two other options to
regulate interexchange competition under the surviving portions of Competitive Carrier.
First, the Commission could have redefined "common carrier" to exclude firms with little
or no market power, an approach it previously rejected. See Competitive Carrier Second
Report, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, para. 5, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982). Only firms possessing
market power would be "common carriers" subject to traditional Title II regulation. See
Competitive Carrier Further Notice, 84 F.C.C.2d 465, para. 54 (1980). However, because
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B. AT&T Regulation
1. Price Caps
The adoption of price cap regulation for AT&T's services constituted
another attempt by the Commission to control AT&T's "dominance" even
though the MFJ had restructured the telecommunications industry and
seemingly eliminated AT&T's market power. 49 The Commission's price
cap scheme created an incentive system designed "to replicate more
accurately than rate of return [regulation] the dynamic, consumer-oriented
process that characterizes a competitive market."4"0 Under rate of return
regulation, carriers have an incentive to operate inefficiently and "'pad'
their costs, regardless of whether additional investment is necessary or
efficient[, because] they are limited to earning a particular percentage return
on investment during a fixed period." '' By contrast, under the incentive
system established by the Commission's price cap regulation, carriers have
a limit on the rates they may charge and therefore must increase their
efficiency and engage in service innovation in order to increase their
profits. Thus, if AT&T still had market power, price cap regulation
would substantially restrain its ability to exercise that power in its pricing
policies.
a firm is a common carrier "by virtue of its functions" and not as a result of being "declared
to be so," such a redefinition likely would have no legal effect. See National Ass'n of Reg.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Second, the Commission could have
lobbied Congress to authorize forbearance. However, because the legislative process is slow
and uncertain, it did not offer the Commission much hope for immediately acquiring
forbearance authority. Thus, like further streamlined regulation, these two alternatives were
unsatisfactory when compared to the Commission simply asserting forbearance authority
under the existing Communications Act provisions.
449. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and
Order and Second Further Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873, 66 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 372 (1989); see also supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
450. AT&TPrice Cap Order, 4 FCC Red. 2873, para. 36, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 372
(1989). Under this scheme, the Commission divided AT&T's services into three "baskets":
(I) residential and small business services; (2) 800 toll-free services; and (3) all other
business services. Id. paras. 359-87. The Commission placed residential and small business
services in their own basket "so that AT&T will not be able to raise prices for these services
in order to lower prices for services that larger business customers use." Id. para. 361. The
Commission also protected residential customers by, among other things, forbidding AT&T
from raising the average residential rate per minute by greater than one percent per year
above a price cap index. Id. paras. 364 & 377.
451. Id. para. 30 (emphasis removed).
452. Id. para. 37.
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2. Deregulation of AT&T's Business Services
In the First Interexchange Report, the Commission made several
findings that facilitated the deregulation of AT&T's business services. First,
the Commission determined that business customers were largely demand
elastic and would readily switch to other carriers in order to obtain better
prices and services." Second, the Commission concluded that AT&T's
competitors had enough available supply capacity to discipline AT&T's
behavior.4 4 Third, the Commission observed that AT&T's rates for
business services had been consistent with the price cap regulation that
governed dominant carriers.455 Fourth, the Commission noted that AT&T's
market share of business services was declining.456 Finally, substantially
changing its Competitive Carrier viewpoint, the Commission held that
AT&T's size, resources, financial strength, and technical capabilities were
not "necessarily" indicia of market power.457 Rather, the Commission
found that "competition in business services is thriving, that AT&T's
competitors are growing, and that consumers are benefiting from these
occurrences.
458
Based on these findings, the Commission stated that it was in the
public interest to proceed with the deregulation of AT&T's business
services.459 To advance this goal, the Commission streamlined its tariff
regulation of AT&T by allowing business tariff filings on fourteen-day
notice without cost support and abolishing all price cap ceilings, service
bands, and rate floors.460 The Commission also allowed AT&T to offer
the business services subject to further streamlined regulation on an
453. First Interexchange Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 36, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1135 (1991).
454. Id. para. 47.
455. Id. para. 49; see also supra notes 449-52.
456. Competitive Carrier First Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, paras. 50-51, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1135. The Commission pointed out that "AT&T's market share in business services
appears to be about fifty percent, a level that is not incompatible with a highly competitive
market." Id. para. 51.
457. Id. para. 60. The Commission further found that "while AT&T may have certain
first-in advantages, no one has shown that these advantages preclude the effective
functioning of the... market." Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. para. 9. Like its earlier decisions to adopt streamlined regulation and forbearance
for nondominant carriers, the Commission found that the costs of maintaining full regulation
of AT&T's business services outweighed the benefits to the public. See id. paras. 8-12.
460. See id. para. 74. The Commission referred to this approach as "further streamlined
regulation." Id. para. 72. When challenged, these tariffs would enjoy a presumption of
validity. Id. para. 74. However, the Commission would still engage in a limited review of
all AT&T tariff filings before they became effective. Id. paras. 73-79.
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individually negotiated contract basis 6' While it determined that
competition in business services was substantial and decided that this
deregulatory approach to AT&T was appropriate, the Commission still did
not hold that AT&T had become a "nondominant carrier."462
3. Retention of Other AT&T Regulation
Even though it recognized that changed market conditions warranted
the deregulation of AT&T's business services, the Commission determined
that competition had not sufficiently developed in certain other service
markets in order to justify AT&T's deregulation there. For example, the
Commission concluded that there was insufficient evidence to hold that
competition in operator services, residential and small business services, and
international services was substantial enough to allow for further stream-
lined regulation.46 Similarly, the Commission found that 800 services
would not be fully competitive until 800 numbers were "portable."''
Once these numbers became portable, the Commission found that 800
services were substantially competitive, eliminated price cap regulation of
AT&T's. 800 services, and applied further streamlined regulation to those
AT&T services.4 65 Thus, the Commission took a deliberately slow
approach to AT&T's deregulation.
4. Assessing The Deregulation of AT&T's Business Services
Although it retained its dominant classification of AT&T, the
Commission finally acknowledged in the Interexchange Rulemaking that
competition generated by the MFJ and the implementation of equal access
461. Id. para. 91. Fourteen days before such a contract became effective, AT&T had to
file a tariff that summarizes the contract and specifies: "(1) the term of the contract,
including any renewal options; (2) a brief description of each of the services provided under
the contract; (3) minimum volume commitments for each service; (4) the contract price for
each service or services at the volume levels committed to by the customers; (5) a general
description of any volume discounts built into the contract rate structure; and (6) a general.
description of other classifications, practices, and regulations affecting the contract." Id. para.
121. The Commission asserted that "the provision of this information will satisfy the
requirements of section 203(a) of the Act, while avoiding disclosure of customer proprietary
information or information that might increase the risk of tacit collusion in the marketplace."
Id.
462. See id. para. 130.
463. Id. paras. 153-61. In taking this position, the Commission demonstrated excessive
caution. It suggested that it would soon find that effective competition existed with regard
to these services. See Interexehange Notice, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, para. 156 (1990).
464. First Interexchange Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 138, 69 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1135
(1991).
465. In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Second Report and
Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 3668, 72 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1114 (1993).
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for interstate long-distance telephone service had diminished AT&T's status
in the interexchange market.4' However, the Commission did not have
to address in this proceeding the issues raised by the judicial rejection of
forbearance because the streamlined regulatory approach it adopted to
govern AT&T's business services still required compliance with all Title II
procedures, such as tariff filing.4 67  Consequently, the Commission
reasonably could have expected its pronouncements in the Interexchange
Rulemaking to withstand judicial scrutiny.
More importantly, the gradual deregulation of AT&T coupled with the
invalidation of forbearance narrowed the substantial gap in the Commis-
sion's regulatory policies toward dominant and nondominant carriers that
began with the First Report in Competitive Carrier. For example, following
the Interexchange Rulemaking, the regulation of AT&T's business services
was virtually identical to the regulation of nondominant carriers' business
servicesA6 Nevertheless, based on the extent to which competitive forces
had become entrenched in the interexchange market since the Commission
commenced Competitive Carrier, the regulation of all interexchange
carriers, including AT&T, on the same terms was long overdue.
5. The Reclassification of AT&T As A Nondominant Carrier
a. The Commission's Analysis
Despite the MFJ and the growth of substantial competition in the
interexchange market since the early 1980s, the Commission did not
respond favorably to AT&T's efforts to obtain a reclassification of its
dominant status until October 1995.469 At that time, the Commission
finally held that "the record evidence demonstrates that AT&T lacks market
466. Interexchange Notice, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, para. 257. The Commission again failed
to explain why it retained AT&T's dominant classification.
467. This approach therefore constituted an acceptable "modification" of the statutory
requirements under the analysis of the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit. See supra notes 291-
362, 398-99 and accompanying text.
468. Because of the judicial repudiation of permissive and mandatory forbearance,
streamlined regulation then governed nondominant carriers. See Competitive Carrier Tariff
Filing Notice, 8 FCC Rcd. 1395, 1396 n.9, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861, 862 n.9 (1993);
see also supra note 424 and accompanying text.
469. See In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier,
Order, II FCC Rcd. 3271, para. 1, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63 (1995) [hereinafter Reclassi-
fication Order]. AT&T had opposed its classification as a dominant carrier since Competitive
Carier commenced. See Competitive Carrier First Report, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 22, 52 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 215. In September 1993, AT&T filed a motion with the Commission
requesting reclassification as a nondominant carrier and, in April 1995, filed exparte papers
supplementing and updating its motion. See Reclassification Order, I I FCC Rcd. 3271, para.
1, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63.
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power in the interstate, domestic, interexchange market" and therefore
warrants that AT&T "be reclassified as a non-dominant carrier with respect
to that market.""47 To reach this conclusion, the Commission relied on the
same market power analysis which had served as the cornerstone of its
Competitive Carrier classification scheme.
The first step in undertaking this analysis was to define the relevant
product and geographic markets for evaluating whether AT&T still
possessed market power.47 Citing the Fourth Report, AT&T argued that
.. interstate, domestic, interexchange services"' constituted the relevant
product and geographic markets for determining whether an interexchange
carrier has market power.47 The Commission acknowledged that it had
applied this standard, treating all interexchange carriers as single output
firms for classification purposes and recognizing no relevant submarkets,
when it had classified AT&T's competitors as nondominant carriers years
earlier.47 Furthermore, while the Commission conceded that demand
substitutability is typically considered in making such a market definition,
it observed that an examination of supply substitutability was instead
appropriate here because no significant difference existed between the
facilities required to provide interexchange services.474 Under these
circumstances, the Commission agreed with AT&T.47
The next step was to determine the standard for assessing whether
AT&T retained market power within the relevant product and geographic
markets.476 Specifically, the issue for the Commission was whether AT&T
had to lack the ability to control prices for each of its services before it
became eligible for reclassification or whether AT&T only had to lack the
ability to control prices in the overall interstate, domestic, interexchange
market before reclassification could occur. According to the Commission,
the evidence demonstrated that reclassification was in the public interest
even though AT&T may have been able to control prices for a limited
number of services because AT&T lacked that ability with respect to the
470. Reclassification Order, 11 FCC Red. 3271, para. 1, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63. To
facilitate "an orderly transition," reclassification became effective 30 days after the
Reclassification Order's October 23, 1995 release date. Id. paras. 167, 172. The Commission
"defer[red] consideration of AT&T's request to be reclassified as non-dominant in its
provision of all international services because that category of services requires a different
market analysis." Id. para. 2.
471. Id. para. 19.
472. Id. para. 20.
473. Id. paras. 21-22.
474. Id. para. 23.
475. Id. paras. 21-23.
476. Id. para. 24.
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overall interstate, domestic, interexchange market.477 The Commission
explained:
AT&T does not have the ability unilaterally to control prices in the
overall interstate, domestic, interexchange market.... [T0 the extent
AT&T has the ability to control price at all, it is only with respect to
specific service segments that are either de minimus to the overall...
market, or are exposed to increasing competition so as not to materially
affect the overall market.... [M]ost major segments of the interex-
change market are subject to substantial competition today, and the vast
Majority of interexchange services and transactions are subject to
substantial competition. Accordingly, ... assessing AT&T's market
power by an 'all-services' standard ... would result in a situation
where the economic cost of regulation outweighs its public bene-
fits.
478
In sum, the Commission concluded that the absence of perfect competition
in the interstate, domestic, interexchange market did not require retention
of AT&T's dominant classification.479
Consistent with its Competitive Carrier approach, the Commission
incorporated fundamental antitrust and economic principles into its market
power analysis.4 80 For example, the Commission found that the supply
and demand elasticity of the interstate, domestic, interexchange market
supported the conclusion that AT&T lacked market power.4"' Similarly,
while acknowledging that AT&T still enjoyed a market share of nearly 60
477. Id. paras. 26-27. Although it admitted that several of its pronouncements during
Competitive Carrier and other proceedings suggested that AT&T had to lack the ability to
control prices for all services before reclassification could occur, the Commission argued that
these statements did not constitute a rule. Id. paras. 28-30; see also supra notes 27-30, 179-
86 and accompanying text (suggesting the existence of such a rule). Even if these statements
nevertheless did establish such a rule, the Commission contended that circumstances required
"either a departure from that policy or a waiver of that rule." Reclassification Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 3271, para. 31, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63 (1995).
478. Id. para. 26. The Commission cited the same consequences of dominant carrier
regulation which it had identified during Competitive Carrier, such as carriers' inability to
offer new services immediately and to respond quickly to competitors' new services because
of the tariff filing requirements. Id. para. 27; see also supra notes 80-131 and accompanying
text.
479. Id. para. 35.
480. Id. paras. 38, 139.
481. Id. paras. 57-66. With respect to supply elasticity, the Commission observed that
AT&T's competitors have sufficient excess capacity or could readily acquire such capacity
in order to respond to the public's needs in the event AT&T overprices. Id. para. 58. With
respect to demand elasticity, the Commission concluded that residential and business
customers believe that the services offered by AT&T and its competitors are comparable and
therefore are not reluctant to switch regularly between carriers. Id. paras. 63-65. Although
it conceded that AT&T had acquired valuable goodwill over the years, the Commission
explained that goodwill is not evidence of market power or demand inelasticity. Id. para. 66.
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percent,4 ' the Commission found that AT&T's 33 percent decline in
market share during the preceding decade, coupled with its loss of local
bottleneck facilities as a result of the divestiture and the maturity of MCI
and Sprint as nationwide competitors, "suggest[ed]" that AT&T now lacked
market power.483 Finally, the Commission rejected claims that AT&T's
cost structure, size, and resources gave it market power, pointing out that
these advantages alone did not establish AT&T's ability to control
price.4  Thus, according to the Commission, a traditional market power
analysis favored AT&T's reclassification.
In addition, despite arguments that AT&T still had the ability to
control prices for certain services within the overall interstate, domestic,
interexchange market and therefore continued to enjoy overall market
dominance, the Commission found otherwise. Refuting claims that AT&T
maintained market power over residential services, the Commission cited
the increasing availability of discounted residential rates, the steady decrease
in prices for discount plans, the growing number of consumers selecting
discount plans over basic residential rates, and the leading role MCI and
Sprint often played in offering discounted residential rates as evidence of
AT&T's inability to raise and sustain residential rates over a competitive
level.48 The Commission likewise determined that business, 800, opera-
tor, and calling card services were substantially competitive and that
AT&T's declining portion of the resale submarket indicated its lack of
482. Id. para. 67. The Commission pointed out that AT&T's market share declined from
approximately 90 percent to 55.2 and 58.6 percent in terms of revenues and minutes
respectively during the preceding 10 years. Id.
483. Id. paras. 67-72. Responding to claims that AT&T's large market share mandated
the conclusion that AT&T retained market power, the Commission noted that "[ilt is well-
established that market share, by itself, is not the sole determining factor of whether a firm
possesses market power," but rather "[o]ther factors, such as demand and supply elasticities,
conditions of entry and other market conditions, must be examined to determine whether a
particular firm exercises market power in the relevant market." Id. para. 68 (footnote
omitted).
484. Id. para. 73. The Commission reiterated its comment in the First Interexchange
Report that the "competitive process itself is largely about trying to develop one's own
advantages, and all firms need not be equal in all respects for this process to work." Id.
(quoting First Interexchange Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 60, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1130 (1991).
485. Id. paras. 78-80. Although the Commission admitted that certain evidence suggested
the existence of tacit price coordination among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint with AT&T as the
price leader, it concluded that such collusion was an industry problem unrelated to whether
AT&T had the unilateral ability to raise and maintain residential rates above competitive
levels. Id. paras. 81-83. The Commission also pointed out that, while not relevant to
resolving this market power debate, AT&T had voluntarily committed to offering two
optional calling plans designed to offset the effects of its inevitable increases in basic
residential rates. Id. paras. 84-87.
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dominance there.4 The only services over which AT&T retained the
ability to control price, analog private line and 800 directory assistance
services, were "so small and insignificant relative to the overall interstate,
domestic, interexchange market (accounting for only .02 percent (0.0002)
of AT&T's total interstate revenues) as to be de minimus."" Consequent-
ly, the Commission held that AT&T's market position with respect to these
services did not require retention of its dominant classification.488
Reclassification meant that AT&T no longer had to comply with the
Commission's burdensome rules governing dominant carriers.489 The
Commission observed, however, that it had been relying on the detailed
information submitted by AT&T to monitor competition in the interex-
change market.49 As a result, the Commission recognized that, without
such information in the future, maintaining the existing minimal reporting
requirements for nondominant carriers might prove insufficient to ensure
unimpeded competition.49' To avert any adverse developments in this
regard, the Commission recommended the implementation of additional
"limited and non-burdensome" reporting requirements for nondominant
carriers.492 Thus, in addition to its obvious impact on competition, the
reclassification of AT&T imposed some real costs on nondominant
carriers. 9
3
b. The Propriety of AT&T's Reclassification
The reclassification of AT&T was long overdue. By its earlier failure
to account for the divestiture of the "bottleneck" BOCs from AT&T in
formulating its policies to promote competition in the interexchange market,
486. Id. paras. 88-99, 116-37. By 1994, AT&T had only 25.6 percent of the resale market
segment and anticipated a decline to 20.3 percent within two years. Id. para. 129.
487. Id. para. 105. Moreover, the Commission anticipated that AT&T's three-year
voluntary agreement to limit any price increases for its interstate analog private line and 800
directory assistance services to the increase in the consumer price index and to file clearly
identified tariff changes increasing prices for these services on not less than five business
days' notice would address any concerns regarding AT&T's continued ability to control
pricing for these services. Id. para. 106.
488. The Commission believed that AT&T's reclassification would not adversely affect
long-standing policies in favor of rate integration, geographic rate averaging, and universal
service. Id. paras. 107-15.
489. Id. para. 164. The Commission removed all of AT&T's domestic residential services
from Basket 1, 800 directory assistance services from Basket 2, and analog private line
service from Basket 3. Only AT&T's international services remained in Basket 1. Id.
490. Id. para. 165.
491. Id.
492. Id. The Commission ordered the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau to determine
which additional disclosures were necessary. Id.
493. Id.
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the Commission made its entire regulatory approach suspect. Once AT&T
also lost significant market share, however, the Commission had no
legitimate excuse for not reclassifying AT&T as a nondominant carrier.
Throughout the decade preceding the Reclassification Order, the Commis-
sion's failure to proffer meaningful evidence to support its position that
AT&T remained a dominant carrier or to cite meaningful benefits accruing
to the public from the imposition of more regulatory burdens on AT&T
than its rivals suggested that the Commission was not adequately fulfilling
its statutory mandate to serve the public interest. The Reclassification
Order, though belated, therefore was a prerequisite to the restoration of the
Commission as the authority on telecommunications policy in the wake of
United States v. AT&T and the forbearance decisions.
Because of its past reluctance to reclassify AT&T, the Commission's
real motivation to do so in October 1995 is uncertain. While the Commis-
sion's delay could have been the result of a desire to err on the side of
caution and not reclassify AT&T until overwhelming evidence mandated
such action, market realities had not changed that dramatically between the
conclusion of Competitive Carrier and the adoption of the Reclassification
Order. Moreover, contrary to its rationale for retaining AT&T's dominant
classification, which implied that market conditions would prohibit a change
in AT&T's status indefinitely, the Commission suggested in the Reclassifi-
cation Order that virtually any justification for changing AT&T's status
immediately was acceptable. The most rational explanation for this sudden
reversal is that the Commission anticipated the passage of the Telecommu-
nications Act, considered AT&T's reclassification necessary to advance
Congress' expressed goal of further enhancing competition in the telecom-
munications industry, and sought to preempt congressional action.
Nonetheless, regardless of the reason, AT&T's reclassification was necessary
to validate the Commission's regulatory approach and promote the public
interest.
VIII. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE REBIRTH OF
FORBEARANCE
While the forbearance decisions placed the Commission's flexibility to
regulate interexchange competition in substantial doubt for the foreseeable
future, the legislative process surprisingly restored that versatility with
relative swiftness as the 104th Congress sought to restructure the telecom-
munications industry through its passage of the Telecommunications Act.
The stated purpose of these new laws was "to provide for a pro-competitive,
deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOUR[lAL
technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunica-
tions markets to competition.' A'  To accomplish this lofty goal, the
Telecommunications Act conferred on the Commission primary responsibili-
ty for devising appropriate regulations to make Congress' intent a reality.
The Telecommunications Act therefore has expressly expanded the
Commission's mandate from ensuring "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service!'415 to promoting a
deregulated, competitive telecommunications industry.496 For the Commis-
sion to fulfill this broadened mandate, however, it needed expansive power.
Congress recognized that forbearance authority constituted such power.
Unlike the 73rd Congress which passed the Communications Act, the
104th Congress made clear its intent with respect to forbearance by
specifically vesting the Commission with that authority and mandating its
exercise under enumerated circumstances. Section 401 of the Telecommu-
nications Act, in relevant part, provides:
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY-Notwithstanding section 332(c)(1)(A)
of this Act, the Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation
or any provision of [the Communications Act of 1934, as amended] to
a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of
telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or
some of its or their geographic markets, if the Commission determines
that-
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary
to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by,
for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecom-
munications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or
unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary
for the protection of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is
consistent with the public interest. 7
Regardless of whether the courts correctly or even reasonably construed the
Communications Act, Congress legislatively has overturned them.4 98
494. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124
(March 1996).
495. 47 U.S.C. § 151; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
496. 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i) and 201(b); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
497. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 401(a), 110 Stat. 56,
128 (emphasis added). Section 332(c)(1)(A) authorizes the Commission to hold that certain
Title II regulations are inapplicable to commercial mobile services. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A)
(1994).
498. The Telecommunications Act allows any carrier or class of carriers to petition for
forbearance treatment and authorizes the Commission to forbear from enforcing statutory or
regulatory provisions if it determines, in its complete discretion, that such action will
promote competition among service providers. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 401 (b)-
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Because this section requires "forbear[ance] from applying any regulation
or any provision of this Act,"4 its coverage is much more expansive than
the forbearance from tariff and facilities regulation which the Commission
had attempted to implement under its section 203 modification authori-
ty." Consequently, if this section had been in effect during Competitive
Carrier, the courts would have had no basis for vacating either permissive
or mandatory forbearance.
Nonetheless, the language of the Telecommunications Act's forbear-
ance provisions suggests that, according to Congress, the courts were correct
when they narrowly construed the word "modify" as used in section 203.
For example, section 402 of the Telecommunications Act requires the
Commission to "repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no
longer in the public interest" during mandatory biennial reviews"0' and
specifies that its provisions "shall [not] be construed to limit the authority
of the Commission to waive, modify, or forbear from applying" any of the
streamlined procedures for changes in charges, classifications, regulations,
or practices set forth therein502 This statutory language reveals Congress'
perception that modifying a regulation is a less severe act than repealing,
waiving, or forbearing from applying one. Otherwise, its use of "repeal,"
"waive," and "forbear" in addition to "modify" would have lacked purpose.
Congress' express adoption of forbearance in the Telecommunications
Act vindicates the positions taken by both the Commission and the courts
during the forbearance cases. Congress' action constitutes a recognition,
consistent with the Commission's position, that forbearance authority is
essential to regulate effectively competition among telecommunications
carriers and ultimately create a deregulated telecommunications industry.
The language employed in taking this action nevertheless indicates that, like
(c), 110 Stat. 128 (such petitions "shall be deemed granted" if the Commission does not
deny them within one year (or 15 months if the Commission exercises its authority to extend
the initial one-year period for 90 days)). The only exceptions to this forbearance authority
are that the Commission may not forbear from applying the interconnection obligations
imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers by new section 251(c) or the prerequisites to
BOC entry into in-region interLATA services set forth in new section 271 until "it
determines that those requirements have been fully implemented." Id. Commentators have
observed that, "[presumably, 'fill implementation' arrives when a BOC secures interLATA
relief on a region-wide, or perhaps even state-wide, basis." See PETER W. HuBER ET AL.,
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: SPECIAL REPORT 61 (1996).
499. Telecommunications Act, sec. 401(a), 110 Stat. at 128 (emphasis added).
500. See supra notes 132-220 and accompanying text. Section 402(b)(2) of the Telecom-
munications Act also.specifically provides that the Commission shall exempt any common
carrier from the requirements of Section 214 of the Communications Act for the extension
of any line. Telecommunications Act, sec. 402(b)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 129.
501. Id. sec. 402(b), 110 Stat. at 129 (emphasis added).
502. Id. see. 402(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 129 (emphasis added).
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the courts, Congress did not construe section 203 to confer such authori-
ty 0 3 Congress' resolution of the forbearance issue, therefore, was both
diplomatic and practical.
Congress' diplomatic adroitness aside, the practical implications of its
decision to codify forbearance are most significant for competition in the
telecommunications industry. Unlike other portions of the Telecommu-
nications Act, the forbearance provisions make sweeping structural changes
in the interexchange market possible immediately. The Commission now
has the opportunity, within the minor constraints imposed by Congress,"
to implement a regulatory approach that it deems most appropriate to
promote competition in the interexchange market with much less risk of
judicial interference. For this reason, the Telecommunications Act's
forbearance provisions, with its potentially radical policy implications, are
likely to have the greatest impact on interexchange competition.
IX. CONCLUSION
Few regulatory policies have an administrative, judicial, and legislative
history like forbearance. Now that Congress has expressly conferred
forbearance authority on the Commission through the Telecommunications
Act, its viability is secure. Moreover, Congress' imposition of mandatory
forbearance under certain circumstances coupled with the Commission's
substantial reliance on forbearance policies in Competitive Carrier suggest
that forbearance will serve a central role in the Commission's regulatory
approach to competition in the interexchange market. While such a role is
appropriate because of the many ways that forbearance advances the public
interest, including its promotion of service innovation, competitive pricing,
market entry, regulatory flexibility, and the conservation of administrative
resources, the success of this approach will depend on the Commission's
ability to account accurately for market realities and to adapt effectively its
policies to them.
Two factors indicate that the Commission will more accurately account
for existing market conditions in its regulatory approach than it has in the
past. First, with its reclassification of AT&T, the Commission is finally in
accord with the basic principle, which it stated at Competitive Carrier's
inception, that the ability to control critical bottleneck facilities creates
market power and thereby acts as the primary impediment to competition.
Second, Congress has reinforced this principle through its limitations on the
503. Of course, the 104th Congress' construction may not comply with the 73rd Congress'
intent in enacting section 203.
504. See supra note 498.
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Commission's exercise of forbearance authority with respect to local
exchange carriers and BOCs, the firms which retain the ability to control
access to the telecommunications network. As a result, having been made
apparent to the Commission, this fundamental flaw of the Competitive
Carrier approach seemingly has been resolved.
In addition, however, the Commission's regulatory approach must have
the versatility to adapt to the dynamism of the telecommunications industry.
Although market power should remain the focus of the Commission's
approach because it is an effective indicator of competitiveness, the
Commission should not merely reinstate the dominant/nondominant carrier
approach it adopted in Competitive Carrier. Contrary to Competitive
Carrier's premise that the interexchange market will have dominant and
nondominant carriers for the foreseeable future, the extent and pace of
technological development in telecommunications require that the
Commissions approach recognize that this market may soon have no
dominant carriers. Congress has acknowledged this possibility, for example,
by establishing conditions for lifting the restriction on BOC participation in
the interexchange market50 5 Consequently, even if the Commission
continues to classify and regulate carriers according to principles of
"dominance," a scheme which may still have usefulness, its approach must
anticipate the eventual reclassification of all dominant carriers and endure
when only firms with nondominant characteristics remain. Unlike its
experience with AT&T, the Commission must demonstrate a willingness to
reclassify dominant carriers, including the BOCs, whenever circumstances
warrant their immediate deregulation. To facilitate this result and comply
with the new regulatory regime established by the Telecommunications Act,
the Commission must adopt an approach that promptly extends forbearance
treatment to as many activities of interexchange carriers as appropriate and
has the goal of extending such treatment to the entire interexchange market
as soon as practicable.
The Commission's initial implementation of the Telecommunications
Act's forbearance provisions suggests that it intends to pursue such a
deregulatory approach. Determining that section 203's tariff-filing require-
ments are unnecessary to ensure that nondominant carriers' charges,
practices, classifications, or regulations for interstate, domestic, interex-
change services are just and reasonable and not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory, the Commission recently has found that forbearing from the
505. See Telecommunications Act, see. 151, §§ 271-276, 110 Stat. at 86-107; see also
supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's expected regulatory
treatment of BOCs after they obtain permission to offer interexchange services).
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tariff regulation of these carriers is in the public interest and therefore
required by the Telecommunications Act.5" 6 When deciding which type
of forbearance policy to adopt, the Commission further reasonably
concluded that mandatory, rather than permissive, forbearance would most
effectively achieve its goal of creating a competitive interexchange market
because it understood that permitting nondominant carriers to file tariffs at
their own discretion could ultimately undermine the benefits of forbear-
ance.50 7 By taking this action less than one year after the enactment of the
506. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace;
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,717, paras. 23-29 (1996); Second Report and
Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,340, paras. 14-66 (1996) (to be codified at47 C.F.R. pts. 42, 61, and
64; effective December 23, 1996) (this proceeding's First Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg.
42,558 (1996) (effective September 16, 1996), issued rules relating to the Telecommu-
nications Act's geographic rate averaging and integration requirements) [hereinafter
Interexchange Forbearance Report]. To support this finding, the Commission relied on the
same factors which it had cited in favor of forbearance for nondominant carriers in earlier
proceedings. For example, the Commission again concluded that: (I) the services provided
by interexchange carriers are close substitutes; (2) consumers of interexchange services are
"highly demand-elastic" and will readily switch carriers in order to obtain better prices if
their carriers attempt to impose unjust or unreasonable rates, terms, or conditions for service;
(3) detariffing will deter tacit price coordination, promote price competition and service
innovation, enable carriers to respond quickly to market demands, and encourage carriers to
tailor their service offerings to the specific needs of their customers; (4) carriers will likely
make the rate and service information set forth in tariffs "available to the public in a more
user-friendly form in order to preserve their competitive position in the market, and as part
of their contractual relationship with customers"; (5) the absence of tariffs will not impede
the public's ability to challenge the lawfulness of carriers' rates, terms, and conditions for
service on the rare occasion it is necessary to do so; and (6) the reimposition of tariff
regulation always remains an option in the unlikely event that forbearance fails. Interex-
change Forbearance Report, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,340, paras. 16-66. Although forbearance
applied to all nondominant carriers, including AT&T, the Commission found that the
"detariffing of [AT&T's] analog private line and 800 directory assistance services at this time
is not in the public interest, and would not meet the statutory forbearance criteria" and
therefore "require[d] AT&T to continue to file tariffs for these services in accordance with,
and for the specified term of, its commitments" as set forth in the Reclassification Order.
Id. para. 106; supra note 487. Within nine months of the end of its three-year commitments
regarding these services, AT&T must cancel its tariffs relating to these services because they
will become subject to forbearance treatment at that time. Interexchange Forbearance
Report, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,340, para. 106.
507. Id. paras. 44-66. The Commission explained that "not permitting nondominant
interexchange carriers to file tariffs with respect to interstate, domestic, interexchange
services will enhance competition among providers of such services, promote competitive
market conditions, and achieve other objectives that are in the public interest, including
eliminating the possible invocation of the filed rate doctrine by nondominant interexchange
carriers, and establishing market conditions that more closely resemble an unregulated
environment." Id. para. 52. Consistent with its findings in the Sixth Report, the Commission
further observed that "[e]ven under existing streamlined tariff filing procedures, requiring
nondominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs for interstate, domestic, interexchange
[Vol. 49
Number 2] REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE IXC MARKET 455
Telecommunications Act, the Commission has timely begun the process of
deregulating the interexchange market through forbearance principles.
The Commission also recently has indicated that it is amenable to
reclassifying and extending forbearance treatment to the remaining dominant
carriers, including the BOCs, when they participate in the interexchange
market. Although the Telecommunications Act authorized BOCs to offer
out-of-region interLATA services upon its effective date without prior
Commission approval,5 8 they remained subject to dominant carrier
regulation pursuant to Competitive Carrier."' Until it more fully considers
this matter, however, the Commission has held that the BOCs' separate
affiliates may now offer such services as nondominant carriers as long as
they comply with the Fifth Report's rules governing interexchange carriers
affiliated with independent local exchange telephone companies."' This
action constitutes the Commission's essential first steps to extending
forbearance treatment to the remaining dominant carriers.
Thus, the Telecommunications Act has given the Commission a
valuable opportunity to restore the credibility of its regulatory approach to
competition in the interexchange market. The Commission will take
advantage of this opportunity as long as it has learned from its mistakes and
does not repeat them. To date, the Commission's implementation of the
Telecommunications Act indicates that it better understands the interex-
change market and will take such advantage. By doing so, the Commission
services impedes vigorous competition in the market for such services by: (1) Removing
incentives for competitive price discounting; (2) reducing or taking away carriers' ability to
make rapid, efficient responses to changes in demand and cost; (3) imposing costs on
carriers that attempt to make new offerings; and (4) preventing consumers from seeking out
or obtaining service arrangements specifically tailored to their needs." Id. para. 53.
508. Telecommunications Act, sec. 151, § 271(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 86.
509. In re Bell Operating Company Provision of Out-of-Region Interstate, Interexehange
Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 6607, paras. 9, 11 (1996); First
Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,964, paras. 10, 12 (1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
ch. 1) (establishing August 8, 1996 effective date) [hereinafter Interim BOC Out-of-Region
Order]; Order on Reconsideration, 61 Fed. Reg. 39,359 (1996) (advancing effective date of
interim order to July 29, 1996).
510. Interim BOC Out-of-Region Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,964, paras. 19-25; see supra
notes 181 and 186 and accompanying text. The Commission noted that "these minimal
requirements should be in place" until it completes the proceedings necessary to "adopt a
comprehensive and cohesive framework that addresses the myriad issues involving BOC
provision of services that the BOCs previously have been barred from offering." Interim
BOC Out-of-Region Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,964, para. 20. It decided to adopt this temporary
policy, "pending a future proceeding to consider more fully the long-term issues raised by
BOC entry into out-of-region, interstate, interexchange services," because it "sought to
balance the goal of the [Telecommunications] Act to allow swift BOC entry into the
interexchange market, subject to interim safeguards, with the need for a comprehensive
review of [its] rules." Id. para. 21.
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will not only enhance its own prestige, but will also fulfill its statutory
mandate to create a deregulated, competitive telecommunications industry
that is responsive to the public's needs.
